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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the interpretation and application of section 36(1) of the 
Commerce Act 1986. The main focus is on how the scope of conduct prohibited 
under the section has been severely curtailed by recent judicial pronouncements on 
the provision. As a consequence the underlying purpose for this particular section, 
preventing monopolies or dominant firms from exploiting their power, is no longer 
being achieved. This is primarily due to the artificial separation of the component 
elements of the section. Individual tests have been created for each element without 
considering the effect this has on the section as a whole. The paper identifies the 
three elements comprised in the section and explains and analyses the judicial tests 
for each element. The paper then illustrates the difficulty with applying a fragmented 
regime of tests to show compliance with the requirements of the section by applying 
the tests to a specific practice that was previously prohibited. As the section is no 
longer achieving its purpose or the intentions of Parliament it is suggested that a 
reassessment of this area of law is required. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 18, OOO words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The long title of the Commerce Act 1986 (the Act) states that it is "[a]n Act to 
promote competition in markets within New Zealand and to repeal the Commerce Act 
197 5" . The Act fulfils various functions from establishing and regulating the 
Commerce Commission, 1 to prohibiting restrictive trade practices, 2 to outlining 
authorisation and clearance procedures for mergers and takeovers. 3 Most of the 
practices that the Act targets relate to agreements between two or more parties that 
have the potential to directly or indirectly affect the market. The conduct aimed at is 
bilateral. One of the only provisions to deal with unilateral conduct is s 3 6 - use of a 
dominant position in a market. 
Section 36 is included in the restrictive trade practices part of the Act and can be seen 
as a means to "remedy or ameliorate the effects of market failure due to the existence 
of monopoly power". 4 The section is not aimed solely at monopolies, any firm that 
comes within the definition of 'dominant position in a market' is potentially liable 
under the section. 5 Section 36 provides that a firm in a dominant position must not 
use that position to restrict entry into, prevent or deter competitive conduct m, or 
eliminate someone from, the market. 
The Commerce Act has been in force for ten years6 and the key to understanding it 
lies in the judicial interpretations of it. Although initially there were very few decisions 
on s 3 6, 7 over the last five years there have been a number of decisions that have had a 
6 
Part I of the Act. 
Part 11 of the Act. 
Part V of the Act. Part III relates to business acquisitions, part IV relates to price controls and 
miscellaneous provisions are contained in Part VII. 
LL Stevens and DK Round "The Commerce Act 1986 - A Legal and Economic Commentary 
Upon Some Fundamental Concepts" (1987) 12 NZULR 231 , 233 . 
'Dominant position in a market ' is defined ins 3(8) of the Act. 
Section 1(2) of the Act provides that " [t]his Act shall come into force on the 1st day of May 
1986." 
There were approximately 10 decisions that referred to s 36, however, most of those decisions 
only briefly analysed s 36 because either they were applications for an interim injunction or the 
main argument related to s 27. Four decisions discussed s 36 at length: A uckland Regional 
Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (A uckland A irport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647; Tru Tone Ltd v 
Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352; Ne w Zealand Magic Ali/lions Ltd 
v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd [ 1990 J 1 NZLR 731 ; and Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson 
Ltd [ 1990] 2 NZLR 662 . 
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significant impact on the interpretation and application of the section. 8 The normal 
judicial approach to analysing the section is to split it into three elements. 9 This is also 
the general approach of academic authors to the topic. 10 The three elements are 
'dominant position in a market', 'use of a dominant position' and 'purpose'. 11 The 
result is that although there is quite a lot of writing on s 36 it is usually aimed at a 
specific element or case and there is a dearth of recent writing addressing the section 
as a whole. 12 This paper addresses the section as a whole. 
A similar approach to that used by the judiciary is followed in this paper. Section 36 is 
divided into its constituent elements and each element is analysed individually. The 
section has changed quite dramatically since it was first enacted in 1986. This is not 
so much through statutory amendment as judicial interpretation. Therefore each 
element is considered on several different levels. Not only is each element discussed in 
reference to how the section is applied in 1996 but also in relation to how the element 
(and consequently s 36) has been developed over the last ten years. The current 
interpretation and application of each element is compared to the interpretation and 
application of the element when the section was first enacted. This will show that 
there has been such development in this area that what may have been the intended 
proscribed conduct in 1986 may no longer be proscribed in 1996. In other words, the 
developments in the case law mean that the original intentions of Parliament are no 
longer being fulfilled . 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
There have been at least 11 cases since 1990. Six of those have involved Telecom with one 
decision from the Privy Council Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385. These cases are discussed further in Part III -
Interpretation and Application of Section 36. 
Gault on Commercial Law splits the section into 6 constituent pieces. 'Dominant position in a 
market' is split into two separate elements - dominant position and market. Gault also adds a 
consideration of s 36(2) and considers the nature of the business of the dominant firm. See M 
Berry, T Housden and TM Gault (eds) Gault on Commercial Lmv (Brooker' s Ltd, Wellington, 
1994) 3-146. 
For example Y van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Lmvs (2 ed, CCH New 
Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 1991) 157. 
There are other requirements such as the dominant firm being a person who supplies or 
acquires goods and services. These additional requirements are discussed further in Part III B 
- Other Prerequisites to Breaching Section 36. 
Two texts that do address the section as a whole arc Gault, above n 9, and van Roy, above n 
10. 
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There are various explanations for this undermining of s 36. The most basic reason is 
that by dividing the section into separate elements and developing different tests for 
each element, the judiciary has lost sight of the overall purpose of the section and 
conduct which should be proscribed is continuing. This is because the threshold tests 
for each element are getting progressively harder to satisfy, thereby giving dominant 
firms more and more scope for avoiding the section. This paper will show that 
although it is necessary to consider the elements of the section separately it is also 
necessary to keep sight of the ' big picture' in order to maintain any real power in the 
section. 
In order to develop these propositions the paper analyses the interpretation and 
application of the section and then applies this analysis to a specific practice that, given 
the policy of the Act, should be prohibited by it. It is therefore necessary to discuss 
the underlying policy and economics of the Act and s 36. Part II of the paper 
addresses these topics by discussing briefly the purpose of promoting competition in 
the market place and the problems associated with monopoly power in the market 
place. 13 
Part III of the paper analyses s 36 itself The basic framework of separating the 
section into its constituent elements has been maintained for ease of analysis. The first 
element is ' dominant position in a market ' which is discussed below in Part III C. 
'Use that position ' is the second element and is discussed in Part III D . The final 
element is ' purpose ' which is discussed in Part III E . There is also a brief discussion 
of the other more general requirements of the section. 
The specific practice addressed in Part IV of the paper is sham litigation. The purpose 
of this part of the paper is to show that certain practices that have all the hallmarks of 
being use of a dominant position are no longer prohibited by s36. The conclusion in 
Part V summarises the problems with s 36 and suggests some reforms that would 
13 Due to constraints of length this discussion is necessarily brief. For more information on 
policy see RJ Adhar (ed) Co111petition Law and Policy in New Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, 
Sydney. 1991). For more information on economics see A Bollard (ed) The Economics of the 
Co111111erce Act (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc, Wellington, 1989); also see 
D Hay and J Vickers (eds) The Econo111ics of A!arket Do111inance (Basil Blackwell Ltd, 
O.\ford, 1987). 
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allow the section to achieve its original purpose: the prevention and punishment of 
unilateral conduct that adversely affects competition. 
II ECONOMICS AND POLICY 
A The Commerce Act 1986 
1 General policy 
New Zealand society is becoming more and more deregulated as time passes. As a 
consequence the market system is mixed. This means that the allocation of resources 
is mainly determined by the price system, productive resources are mainly privately 
owned and there is limited Government influence and ownership.14 The difficulty 
facing the New Zealand system is that the elimination of regulation from markets may 
permit conduct that distorts the advantages of the market. If markets do not work 
properly15 it can lead to situations where there is inefficiency, Jack of choice for 
consumers, restricted supplies of goods and services, lower quality goods and services 
and unnecessarily high prices. Paradoxically it is necessary to regulate to try to 
prevent these problems from occurring. The Commerce Act intervenes in the market 
by prohibiting particular business practices which would otherwise be lawful. Various 
other statutes in New Zealand also try to regulate the economy in a ' light-handed 
way', for example the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 , which is also aimed at specific 
behaviour of participants in the market. 16 
The intervention in any market requires the "interplay of political, social and economic 
factors ... ". 17 The interplay of these particular factors has meant that the Commerce 
Act could not intervene in the market system through an ad hoe approach to 
prohibiting particular business practices. It was necessary to use a tool that would 
help achieve the long term objectives of consumer welfare and efficiency and the tool 
14 
15 
16 
17 
J Horsman Graphic Economics (Longman Paul Ltd, Auckland 1979) 6. 
Whether a market works properly or not will depend almost entirely on exactly which 
economic model is being used. Common models used are perfect competition and perfectly 
contestable markets. 
Other examples are the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
Above n 4, 231. 
chosen is competition. 18 Competition "tends to be diffusive of economic and political 
power, to result in greater consumer choice, to stimulate productive and allocative 
efficiency, and to lower prices. " 19 
Parliament could have enacted legislation with the specific objectives of economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare but these objectives may have necessitated more 
intervention than the Government was willing to tolerate at the time. It was felt that 
the same objectives could be achieved through the use of competition and the market 
system. It is clearly accepted that competition is a means of achieving the desired 
consequences rather than the desired consequence itself 20 It is "best regarded as a 
mechanism or process for achieving efficiency and economic growth. "21 This is 
supported by the Court of Appeal which stated that the Act "is based on the premise 
that society's resources are best located in a competitive market where rivalry between 
firms ensures maximum efficiency in the use of resources. "22 
2 Economics 
Economics underlie many of the core components of the Act such as market, 
competition and dominant position. Therefore economic concepts, models and 
theories are inexorably linked with the Act. The judiciary have come under some 
criticism because judges "reveal a lack of comfortable understanding of, or familiarity 
with, economic learning about markets or, indeed, competition matters generally."23 
However, this is not necessarily all the fault of the judiciary. Economics is neither a 
straightforward nor an exact science for the judiciary to understand. This is implicitly 
acknowledged by the allowance for lay members to sit in certain situations.24 
Economists may also add to this confusion by misleading "the judiciary with 
"extremely unrealistic" models which are inappropriate for application to competition 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
RH Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealand Competition Law: 
From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" (1993) 15 NZULR 265 , 265 . 
PH Clarke Recent Developments in the Australian Law of lv/onopolization (Commerce Act 
Workshop, Wellington, 1988) 16. 
Above n 18, 290. 
Above n 4, 237 . 
Sec Tru Tone Ltd above n 7, 358. 
Above n 19, 7. 
Sections 77 and 78 of the Act. 
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law."25 To confuse matters more, there is enough divergence in economic theory to 
enable participants in litigation to 'buy' an economist. 
An important distinction that needs to be drawn in relation to the Commerce Act is the 
difference between protecting and promoting competition and protecting competitors. 
Although in addressing the problems associated with competition it may necessarily be 
a requisite to look at a specific competitor, this is not the main aim of the Act. The 
general competition tests contained in the bilateral prohibition sections such as 
substantially lessening competition are less likely to cause this type of problem than the 
unilateral conduct provision of s 36. 26 
When attempting to use a statute to promote competition in the market it is necessary 
to address the possible occurrence of a monopoly in the market because: 27 
(m]arket economies recognize, however, that competition itself requires protection 
because it is possible for businesses to amass such considerable economic strength that 
they become immune from the competitive process and the disciplines which that 
process imposes. Competition legislation in general terms is designed to protect the 
competitive process by preventing the acquisition and abuse of undue economic power. 
The specific approach of the Act to situations of dominance or monopoly m the 
market is addressed below. 
B Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
1 General pohcy 
The general objective of the Commerce Act is to promote competition. Section 36 is 
aimed at specific practices that could undermine this objective. It is based on Article 
86 of the Treaty of Rome and is aimed at the unilateral conduct of domjnant firms . It 
25 
26 
27 
B Jew "Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand by RJ Adhar - A Review" (1992) 7 
AULR 237, 237. 
This is discussed further in Part II B 1 - General Policy. 
Above n 18, 266. 
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prohibits a firm in a dominant position from using that position for certain proscribed 
purposes. Section 36: 28 
seeks to improve market performance and the use of society's scarce resources by 
limiting, or controlling, the discretionary power which some firms possess to advance 
their own causes, unconstrained by market processes, at the expense of the welfare of 
society in general. 
Originally it was thought that the phrases used in the section were too vague and there 
would be definitional problems.29 However, these fears were allayed because of the 
interconnection with Article 86 which has had various cases decided under it which 
would help with definitional problems. The Commerce Act is also loosely based on 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) so Australian case law is particularly relevant to 
New Zealand cases. 
The mere existence of a monopoly or dominant firm does not contravene the section. 
It is the behaviour of firms that is at issue not their relationship to the market. In an 
economy the size of New Zealand it is sometimes necessary to have extremely large 
firms in order to achieve the economies of scale necessary to make the business viable. 
This is normally referred to as productive or technical efficiency. The problem is the 
potential exploitation of the position in the market that could lead to allocative, 
productive and technical inefficiency. 30 Therefore the conduct of the monopoly or 
dominant firm is at issue. It is necessary to get a balance between the need to have 
these large firms and the need for consumer welfare and economic efficiency. As 
Utton states "in a very real sense, the possible conflict between technical and allocative 
efficiency lies at the heart of many antitrust questions. " 31 
Any provision aimed at preventing monopolies or dominant firms from exploiting their 
power needs to: 32 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Above n 4, 233. 
(1985) 468 NZPD 8591. 
This is explained further in Part II B 2 - Economics. 
MA Utton A!arket Dominance and Antitrust Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, England, 
1995) 14. 
Above n 19, 16. 
be able to distinguish between what may be termed "pro-competitive conduct", that is, 
conduct which, even when engaged in with the object of ultimately achieving a 
monopoly, involves increased rivalry between firms through such means as product 
improvement or price reductions, and "anti-competitive conduct", that is, conduct 
whose immediate aim is to reduce rivalry. Then, it needs to be able to prohibit the 
latter without impeding the former. 
8 
Theoretically this is what s 36 is trying to achieve. The best analogy is that of a race.33 
Section 36 is aiming for a fair start . Natural ranking will occur simply because some 
runners are better than others, but as long as there is a equal chance at the beginning 
that is all that matters . The real question is whether this is what is actually achieved by 
the provision. 
The nature of the proscribed purposes as outlined in s 36(1)(a)-(c) can easily lead to 
the belief that the section is protecting competitors not competition. However, one 
has to read this section in light of the whole Act. It has been suggested that if an 
abuse of dominant position provision allows a firm to eliminate its less efficient 
competitors from the market through "efficiency-based non-exclusionary behaviour ... 
[it] is a competition-oriented law .. . ". 34 It is submitted that this conduct is 
theoretically not proscribed by s 3 6 and if the section is interpreted correctly is what it 
achieves. Unfortunately, as discussed below, this is not necessarily how the section is 
being interpreted and applied in practice. 
2 Economics 
This paii of the paper explains exactly why it is believed that if monopolies and other 
firms in dominant positions are left unregulated it can lead to a loss of consumer 
welfare and general economic inefficiency. The analysis is based on a situation where 
there is a monopolistic market. Diagram one is a simple supply and demand curve. 
The demand curve is equivalent to the average revenue of the monopoly. The supply 
33 
34 
Above n 31, 15. 
LF Hampton "Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 1986: An Analysis of its Constituent 
Elements" in RJ Adhar (ed) Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand (The Law Book Co 
Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 179, 214. 
9 
curve is horizontal because it is assumed that the monopoly's long-run average cost is 
constant and consequently will be the same (in the long-run) as marginal cost. 
p2 ....... .. . 
pl 
MR 
ql q2 
Diagram One 
AR=D 
If this was a perfectly competitive 
market, equilibrium would be where the 
demand curve intersected with supply, 
point q2p 1 in the diagram. However, 
because this is a monopolistic market 
the profit maximisation point for the 
monopoly is where marginal cost is 
equal to marginal revenue, point q 1 p2. 
The difference between the demand 
price and marginal cost is the monopoly 
profits . The difference m pnce 
indicates that the consumers would be 
prepared to pay a sum equal to the 
shaded area to increase production to 
q2. The increase to that quantity of production would generate a consumer benefit. 
Logically, because the production is restricted to q 1, there is a loss to consumers equal 
to the shaded triangle. As Utton describes the situation: 35 
[t]he fact that the monopolist would restrict output below [ q2] implies that resources are 
being misallocated: too few resources are devoted to monopoly production in order that 
price can be maintained above marginal cost. The monopolist ' s pricing behaviour 
therefore leads to allocative inefficiency. At the heart of economists ' case against 
monopoly is this price-cost divergence and the resource misallocation that results. 
Although a monopoly is not necessarily productively inefficient there are few 
incentives to maintain efficiency of production as the monopoly profits are not being 
threatened by competitive forces . This means that a monopoly market could be both 
allocatively and productively inefficient. There is also some support for the idea that 
35 Above n 31. 5. 
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monopolies are less innovative than compet1t1ve firms, 36 however, the counter 
argument is that if the monopoly wishes to retain that status it has to be innovative. 
The analysis is not exactly the same for dominant firms but the general theory of 
pricing above marginal cost is the same, with a consequence that there is an 
opportunity for dominant firms to earn monopoly profits in the same manner as 
monopolies. The Commerce Act addresses these issues by intervening in the market 
and making it difficult for monopolies to maintain the market for themselves. It may 
not be possible for competition to occur in every market, but the Act attempts to 
ensure that there is at least the opportunity for competition. 
III INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 36 
A Introduction and Approach 
The focus of this part of the paper is s 36(1) of the Commerce Act. This section 
reads: 
36. Use of a dominant position in a market-
(1) No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for 
the purpose of-
( a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct 
in that or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
Section 36(2) provides for protection in certain circumstances of statutory intellectual 
property rights and s 36(3) prevents s 36(1) from applying when the conduct in 
question has been authorised under Part V of the Act. 37 It is not important for present 
purposes how these two subsections are interpreted or applied. 
36 
37 
Above n 31, 7-8. 
For more information on intellectual property rights and s 36 see Al van Melle "Refusals to 
License Intellectual Property Rights: The Impact of RTE & ITP v European Commission 
('Afagil/ ') on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law" (Forthcomjng, December 
1996/January 1997 ABLR). 
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The normal approach to understanding the section is to split it into three elements and 
this is the approach taken by this paper. 38 The specific approach of this paper is to 
outline the statutory definitions and tests relating to each element, discuss and analyse 
the cases decided that relate to the element, outline any residual problems with those 
judicial interpretations and if necessary outline possible reforms to rectify those 
problems. 
B Other Prerequisites to Breaching Sechon 36 
There are other factors to consider when deciding whether particular conduct has 
breached s 36. The elements outlined below are the most difficult and controversial 
parts of the section. However, certain other requirements must be fulfilled otherwise 
there is no cause of action under the section. 
The first requirement is that the dominant firm is a person. Person is defined in s 2 of 
the Act as "a local authority, and any association of persons whether incorporated or 
not. " This definition includes most entities including trade associations, partnerships, 
companies and compound structures such as parent and subsidiary companies. The 
entity affected by the conduct must also come within this definition . It is a person who 
is restricted or prevented from entering the market or eliminated from the market. 
The most likely reason that there would be no breach is because the person who has a 
dominant position is not a supplier or acquirer of goods or services. On first reading 
of the section it does not appear that this is a requirement but the definition of 
' dominant position in a market' in s 3 (8) of the Act includes this requirement. 39 Most 
entities would still fall within this definition although it is questionable whether trade 
associations would . A trade association is a person but does not supply goods or 
services in a market. The standard interpretation is that because the association does 
not supply anything other than services to its members it probably does not fall within 
the definition of ' dominant position in a market' . 40 However, in the right 
circumstances a trade association may actually be supplying services in a market, for 
example, if it only supplies its members and there are other potential users of those 
38 
39 
40 
See above n 9. 
Section 3(8) is discussed at length in Part III C 3 - Dominant Position. 
See above n 9, 3-146. 
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services. If the association uses any dominance in providing those services to trade 
members to affect another market, there is a potential breach of s 36. 
Other requirements that need to be satisfied apply generally to the Act rather than 
specifically to s 36. For example the restrictions on application of the section to the 
Crown and Crown Corporations in ss 5 and 6. These requirements will usually only be 
important in specific fact situations and the purpose of this paper is to address the 
typical situation rather than a situation involving strange or unusual circumstances. 
C Dominant Position in a Market 
l Overview 
There is some debate over exactly whether the determination of the relevant market 
should be done separately to the analysis of the dominant position in that relevant 
market or as part of the same process. There is case law to suggest that identification 
of the relevant market is necessary before considering the dominance of the firm in 
question. 41 However, there is also case law to suggest that defining the relevant 
market and deciding on dominance need to be done together. 42 Gault on Commercial 
Law considers that "it is necessary, therefore, to keep the concept of "dominance" in 
mind when defining the relevant market, for each concept has meaning only in relation 
to the other. "43 This does not necessarily mean that you cannot separate out the 
analysis for each part. The important thing to remember is that you cannot ignore the 
conduct at issue when defining the relevant market. 
The Court of Appeal applies the two step approach as evidenced by its decision in 
Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission. 44 The Court addressed the issue of 
relevant market first before moving on to the conduct at issue. However, it was 
obvious from the judgment that the market definition was not done completely in 
isolation of the conduct at issue. 45 Therefore although these are interrelated concepts 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
See Tru Tone Ltd above n 7, 358. 
For example Queensland Wire Industries Pzv Ltd v The Broken Hill Propriel01:V Company Ltd 
(1989) ATPR 40-925, 50,008. 
Above n 9, 3-146. 
Unreported, 3 July 1996, Court of Appeal, CA 169/95, 5-10. 
Above n 44, 9. 
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this paper proceeds on the basis of defining the relevant market, keeping in mind the 
conduct at issue, and then addressing the issue of dominance. 
2 Market46 
(a) Statutory definitions 
The starting point for any consideration of the relevant market has to be the definition 
of market. Competition law prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act had no definition 
of market although it was an important concept when examining trade practices. In 
the Commerce Act 1986 market is defined ins 3(1A). It provides that: 
[ ij,ery reference in this Act, except the reference in section 36A(l)(b) and (c) of this 
Act, to the term "market" is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or 
services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact and commercial 
common sense, are substitutable for them. 
This is different to the original enactment where the market was defined as meaning "a 
market for goods and services within New Zealand that may be distinguished as a 
matter of fact and commercial common sense. "47 This differed from the Australian 
definition which included the idea of substitutability. 48 It is unclear whether the 
change occurred due to several decisions of New Zealand courts which indicated that 
substitutability was not the test for market and that Australian decisions were not 
necessarily relevant due to the difference in definition, 49 or whether it was merely due 
to change in the philosophy of the Government of the day towards a more economic 
approach to markets. 50 However, the Courts have accepted the new definition as 
meaning that substitutability is a consideration but is not the deciding factor for 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
For a general discussion of the market principles see M Brunt '"Market Definition' Issues in 
Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation" (1990) 18 ABLR 86. 
The definition was changed bys 3(1) of the Commerce Amendment Act 1990. 
Section 4E Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
For example Tru Tone Ltd above n 7, 359; ARA above n 7, 669: and Apple Fields Ltd v The 
New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (1989) 2 NZBLC 103,56-l, l03 ,577. 
Trade Practices Commission Review of the Co111111erce Act 1986: Co111111ent by the Australian 
Trade Practices Commission on Department of Trade and lndus/Jy Discussion Paper 
(Australia, 1988) 4; also see Business Competition and Corporate Affairs Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry Review of the Co111111erce Act 1986: A Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, 1988) 12. 
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defining the market. 51 In Telecom C01poration of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce 
Commission the High Court stated that :52 
[t]he practical eITect of the revised wording appears to be no more than to make the 
relevance of economic substitutability explicit. ... We see no source of conflict or 
tension in the juxtaposition of the two elements, substitutability and commercial 
common sense, in this formulation. 
(b) Case law 
There is a plethora of case law which expands on the statutory definition of market. 53 
Two of the foundation cases on market definition are Re Edmonds Foods Ltc/54 and Re 
Queensland Co-operative Mi fling Assn Ltd. 55 Both these cases predate the 1986 Act 
but are still being used today. 56 In these cases phrases such as "the field of rivalry 
between [firms]" have been used to define market. 57 Edmonds Foods provided New 
Zealand's most cited judicial definition of market when it defined market as "a field of 
actual or potential transactions between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be 
strong substitution, at least in the long run, if given sufficient price incentive" . 58 
The demarcation of the relevant market is a question of fact. Therefore the case law 
on the definition of market is mainly useful in identifying the approach to be taken 
when interpreting the facts. The definition of the relevant market is not an easy issue 
to determine, however, there is an accepted general approach to the issue. The 
decision in Telecom v Commerce Commission (HC) clearly illustrates this approach.59 
The High Court outlined three basic steps to be undertaken when assessmg the 
relevant market. The first step is to "seek to identify the constraints upon the price 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Above n -l4 , 7. 
(1991) 4 TCLR 473 , -l99. This case is subsequently referred to as Telecom v Commerce 
Commission (HC). 
Almost all of the cases relating to s 36 have discussed market at some length. The most recent 
in-depth discussion is the decision in Telecom v Commerce Commission (HC) above n 52 . 
21 June 1984, Commerce Commission Decision No 84. 
(1976) ATPR 40-012. 
Above n 44, 6; and above n 42, 50,015 . 
Above n 55. 17,247. 
Above n 54, 4-5. 
Above 52. 501-504. 
and production policies of firms or divisions of firms whose conduct is of relevance for 
the matters litigated. "60 The next step is to address substitutability issues, both for 
supply and demand . This can be done by using cross elasticities of both supply and 
demand as this will show the "extent to which the supply of or demand for a product 
responds to a change in the price of another product. " 61 Utton argues that this tool of 
analysis is impractical because the information required to calculate the elasticities is 
almost impossible to obtain.62 This impracticality is probably borne out by the fact 
that quite often the court seems to merely play lip service to the concepts of elasticity 
of demand or supply and then simply looks at substitutability.63 The techniques used 
in assessing the constraints and any substitutability will also be important to the 
consideration of dominant position. This is discussed further below. 64 
The last step the court will take is to examine the different dimensions of the market. 65 
The four dimensions are : product; functional ; geographic; and time.66 All three factors 
are not entirely separate from each other and this is particularly obvious when you 
consider the four dimensions of market. 
The product dimension is usually assessed by looking at the effect a change in price 
will have on supply and demand . In other words substitutability. If a large change in 
price does not affect demand or supply, there is low elasticity and substitutability. The 
appropriate functional divisions in any market will depend on "whatever will best 
expose the play of market forces, actual and potential, upon buyers and sellers . "67 
The functional dimension is the classic division into the horizontal levels of 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail. This does not mean that vertical combinations of 
firms are ignored. The definition of person ensures that ' associations of persons ' are 
considered as one person so compound structures will still be caught by the Act. 
Splitting the market into horizontal levels is merely a tool of analysis and is not always 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Above n 52, 501. 
Above n 42, 50,014. 
Above n 31, 11. 
Above n 52, 504. 
See below Part III C 3 - Dominant Position. 
Above n 52, 502. 
Telecom v Co111111erce Commission (HC) focused on the dimensions of function and time. 
Above n 52, 502. 
Above n 52, 502. 
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followed , for example in Tru Tone it was necessary to consider the wholesale and 
retail market at the same time due to the unusual factual circumstances. 68 
The third dimension to be considered is geographical. The definition of market in s 
3(1A) of the Act contemplates a 'market in New Zealand' and no wider. Quite often 
the market will be New Zealand wide as for example in Telecom v Commerce 
Commission (HC).69 However, it may sometimes be necessary to define the market as 
something less than New Zealand wide as evidenced by Port Nelson70 and Auckland 
Regional Authority.71 The geographic dimension of the market is not determined by 
the place of business of the companies involved. Considerations are the pattern of 
demand, the area of buying and selling, convenience, cost and of course transport. 
Under s 3(3) imports may be considered when adding up the competition in that 
market. 72 Therefore there is the potential to extend the geographical boundaries of the 
market beyond New Zealand in some circumstances. However, according to Tipping 
J, "services supplied outside New Zealand by persons not resident or not carrying on 
business in New Zealand are irrelevant when defining the market within New Zealand 
or assessing dominance within it. "73 
The last dimension, time, is a fairly new addition to the analysis. ' 4 It is closely related 
to supply substitutability as it considers potential competitors in the market. Originally 
it was thought that only existing competitors and technology had relevance to the 
market, however, under this dimension the courts will look at potential competitors as 
well. This will include "those sources of supply that come about from redeploying 
existing production and distribution capacity but stop short of including supplies 
arising from entirely new entry."75 An infinite time frame is impractical so 
68 
69 
70 
71 
71 
73 
74 
75 
See Tru Tone Ltd above n 7, 360. For more discussion on this point see above n 10, 63. 
Above n 52. 
Above n 44, 9. 
Above n 7, 672 . 
Section 3(3) provides: 
For the purposes of this Act, the effect on competition in a market shall be determined 
by reference to all factors that affect competition in that market including competition 
from goods or services supplied or likely to be supplied by persons not resident or not 
carrying on business in New Zealand. 
See New Zealand Jvlagic Jvlillions above n 7, 759 . 
Gault on Commercial Law addresses all four dimensions, above n 9, 3-28; whereas van Roy 
only addresses the first three, above n 10, 61-65 . 
Above n 52, 503 . 
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considerations will be how long it would take for those potential competitors to 
actually compete, how long it will take for the technology to be redeployed and how 
serious those potential competitors are about competing. 76 This is indirectly 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson77 when Gault J cited a passage from 
Queensland Wire . In that case Deane J stated that :78 
[t]he outer limits (including geographic confines) of a particular market are likely to be 
blurred: their definition will commonly involve assessment of the relative weight to be 
given to competing considerations in relation to questions such as the extent of product 
substitutability and the significance of competition between traders at different stages of 
distribution. While actual competition must exist and be assessed in the contex1 of a 
market, a market can exist if there be the potential for close competition even though 
none in fact exists. 
(c) Other problems and issues 
The most fundamental problem facing any court trying to decide the relevant market is 
how widely to define the market. Counsel alleging the breach of s 3 6 will try to have 
market defined as narrowly as possible. Conversely, counsel defending the breach will 
try to have the market defined as widely as possible. The court has to make sense of 
the completely contrasting arguments. This is made even more difficult by the number 
of expert economic witnesses that are normally used in a Commerce Act case. 79 
Ultimately the relevant market is a question of fact and is in the court ' s discretion. 
An interesting aspect of s 36 is that most conduct that potentially breaches the section 
will involve two markets, the market that the firm is dominant in and the market that is 
being affected by that firm 's conduct. They do not have to be the same market. This 
is because the section specifically says ' in that or any other market ' when defining the 
proscribed purposes.80 Occasionally a court has stated that the firm is dominant in 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Above n 52, 503 . 
Above n -1-4, 8. 
Above n 42, 50,013. 
Several expert witnesses were called to discuss the Baumol-Willig rule in Clear 
Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (1992) 5 TCLR 166. 
Referred to in the text as Clear v Telecom (HC). 
Section 36(l)(a)-(c). 
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both markets. An example is Auckland Regional Authority where Barker J thought 
the Authority was dominant in the supplying of rental booths and in the renting of 
cars,81 an obvious error. 
While keeping in mind the conduct at issue, as discussed above, 82 the court has to 
make sure that the conduct at issue does not automatically define the relevant market. 
It is arguable that this is what happened in the Auckland Regional Authority case. 83 
The conduct at issue was the Authority restricting the number of rental booths at 
Auckland Airport. The relevant market was "a market for rental car services at 
Auckland airport .. . ". 84 A closely related problem is how to define a market when one 
of the parties concedes that they are dominant. Should the court simply accept 
whatever definition of the market that the conceding party gives? As should be 
evident this is extremely problematic as what the relevant market is has an enormous 
impact on the other elements of s 36. 
Finally, although market definition is an important part of any analysis under most of 
the restrictive trade practices provisions, it is particularly relevant to the concept of 
dominant position. This is because dominance will depend entirely on how the market 
is defined. The two overlap considerably as the "choice of market definition relates 
specifically to the case or matter under consideration. "85 Dominant position is 
discussed in the next part of the paper. 
3 Dominant position 
(a) The statutory test for 'dominant position in a market' 
'Dominant position in a market' is defined ins 3(8) of the Act. The definition is based 
on Article 86 of the Treaty ofRome. 86 Section 3(8) provides: 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
See ARA above n 7, 678: another example is Union Shipping above n 7, 706. 
See discussion in Part III C l - Overview. 
See ARA above n 7. 
See ARA above n 7, 677. 
J Feil and K Smith Structure and Conduct: The Assessment of dominance Under the 
Commerce Act 1986 (New Zealand Trade Practices Workshop, Auckland, 1987) 6. 
Above n 10, 75 ; also above n 44, 35. 
3. Certain terms defined in relation to com1Jetition -
(8) For the purposes of sections 36 and 36A of this Act, a dominant position in a 
market is one in which a person as a supplier or an acquirer of goods or services 
either alone or together with any interconnected body corporate is in a position 
to exercise a dominant influence over the production, acquisition, supply, or 
price of goods or services in that market and for the purposes of determining 
whether a person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence over the 
production, acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in a market regard 
shall be had to-
( a) The share of the market, the technical knowledge, the access to materials 
or capital of that person or that person together with any interconnected 
body corporate: 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of 
competitors or potential competitors in that market: 
(c) The extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of suppliers 
or acquirers of goods or services in that market. 
Originally s 3(8) defined 'dominant position in a market' for both the purposes of the 
restrictive trade practice provisions and the merger and takeover provisions contained 
in s 66 and 67 of the Act. The section was amended in 1990 by restricting the 
application of s 3(8) to ss 36 and 36A and by adding a new s 3(9) to apply to business 
acquisitions. 87 
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Although s 36 is similar to s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) there are some 
substantial differences. 88 The most important difference is the threshold requirement. 
The Australian provision requires that the corporation has 'a substantial degree of 
power in a market' whereas New Zealand ' s legislation uses ' dominant position' . This 
means that the threshold requirement in Australia is lower than in New Zealand. 
Indications of what to consider in determining the degree of power the corporation has 
are given in s 46(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth),89 however, this section 
differs markedly from s 3(8) of the Commerce Act. 
87 
88 
89 
Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Commerce Amendment Act 1990. 
Relevant portions of s 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) are included in Appendix A. 
Section -l6(3) is included in Appendix A. 
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The test ins 3(8) is encapsulated by the phrase "a dominant position in a market is one 
in which a person . . . is in a position to exercise a dominant influence over the 
production, acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in that market". Three 
factors to take into consideration when deciding this issue are outlined in ( a), (b) and 
(c) . Feil and Smith explain these factors further by stating that: 90 
[p]aragraph (a) is concerned principally with the attributes of the particular firm and 
implicitly with its position in the market as a whole. The investigation under this 
paragraph would include a basic description of the market structure. However it is by 
no means determinative of whether a firm has a dominant position. It is then necessary 
in terms of paragraph (b) to look at the operation of competitive forces in the market 
and the ability of those to limit the actions of the firm. Paragraph (c) completes the 
analysis by considering the level of any countervailing market power in the hands of 
those supplying the firm or purchasing its output. 
It is important to note that the three factors are not a test in themselves and are not an 
exhaustive list. In fact the Commerce Commission expanded on these factors in the 
Re Proposal by News Ltd decision. 91 Examples of extra considerations are: the degree 
of market concentration, financial stability of the merged concern and the extent of 
vertical integration .92 It is debatable whether this expanded list of factors actually 
adds to the original three or merely explains them further. However, the High Court 
approved of this expansion in Lion Corporation Ltd v Commerce Commission. 93 
Although not cited specifically in most of the judgments relating to s 36, the passage 
from News Ltd is implicitly referred to in most s36 cases. 94 
(b) How much influence is enough? 
The main problem with the definition given ins 3(8) is that it is circular. A person in a 
dominant position is defined as someone having a dominant influence. The question 
that arises from this is still what is meant by dominant? How much influence must the 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Commerce Commission Current Issues in New Zealand Competition and Consumer law 
(Wellington, 1988) vol 1, p 6. 
( 1986) 6 NZAR 4 7, 51 . The full expansion is quoted in Appendix B. 
Above n 91 , 52. 
lion Corporation Ltd v Commerce Co111mission (1987] 2 NZLR 682, 691. 
See Neiv Zealand A!agic Ali/lions above n 7, 747. 
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firm have before it is considered dominant? The courts will analyse various factors to 
decide this issue, as discussed below, but there is still a need to decide the threshold 
requirement for dominance. 
The cases decided on this issue can be divided into two types : those that use a 
specialised economic definition of dominance; and those that look at the ordinary or 
dictionary meaning of dominance. The former span the late 1980s up until the 1992 
Court of Appeal decision in Telecom Corporahon of New Zealand v Commerce 
Commission.95 
A pure economic definition of dominance is: 96 
the ability of a fim1 or group of firms persistently to hold price above long-run average 
costs without thereby losing so many sales that the price level is unsustainable. 
The decisions relating to s 3(8) regarding the economic definition of dominant position 
are not this technical. The general proposition is that a dominant position occurs when 
the firm has the "ability to act independently of the constraints that a competitive 
market would normally provide. "97 Various catch phrases were used in the decisions 
such as "economic strength", "ability to act independently", "discretionary behaviour" 
and "lack of restraint" .98 Perhaps one of the best renditions of the pre-Telecom v 
Commerce Commission (CA) threshold definition is from Proposal by Broadcast 
Communications Ltd where the Commerce Commission stated that :99 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
[d]ominance exists when a person is in a position of economic strength such that it can 
behave to a large extent independently of that person 's competitors. A person in a 
dominant position will be able to effect an appreciable change in the price and or other 
[1992] 3 NZLR 429. From this point onwards this case is referred to as Telecom v Commerce 
Commission (CA). The High Court decision, above n 52, is referred to as Telecom v 
Commerce Commission (HC) . 
Above n 31, 10. 
Above n 18, 271. 
Re Magnum Corporation Ltd and Dominion Bre111eries Ltd (1986) 2 TCLR 177, 195; Lion 
Corporation Ltd above n 93 , 690; Union Shipping above n 7, 703; Ne 111 Zealand Magic 
Ali/lions above n 7, 758; and ARA above n 7, 679 . 
[1990] NZAR 433 , 448. 
aspects of supply of his goods and services and to maintain this change for an 
appreciable length of time without suffering a serious adverse impact on profitability. 
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This definition was criticised by the High Court in Telecom v Commerce Commission 
because "' appreciable' can mean perceptible, discernible, noticeable; and it can also 
mean considerable, large, or fairly large, and, perhaps a different shade of meaning, 
material." 100 The Court sympathised with the Commission's desire to delineate a more 
precise standard but though that "in the abstract, the test can [not] be pushed very 
far ." 101 Instead the High Court focused on the phrase ' high market power' which was 
described as where "there is a large discretion to depart from competitive behaviour 
e.g. a large pricing discretion or a large discretion to choose the pace of technological 
change. " 102 
Several European Community cases also support an economic definition of 
dominance, 103 for example Re Conhnental Can Inc. 104 The High Court of Australia 
also uses an economic definition of market power describing it as : 105 
the ability of a firm to raise prices above the supply cost without rivals taking away 
customers in due time, supply cost being the minimum cost an efficient firm would 
incur in producing the product ... 
There are a number of cases that could be discussed with regard to the economic 
definition, with each having a slight variation of an economic definition, however, it is 
more relevant to discuss the present approach to ' dominant position' . This is outlined 
by the Court of Appeal's interpretation of dominance in Telecom v Commerce 
Comm;ssion and the subsequent cases. 106 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
Above n 52, 510. 
Above n 52 , 510. 
Above n 52, 513 . 
For more information on European Community cases see above n 10, 74-80; above n 18, 267-
271 ; also see A Riley The EEC Approach to ''Do111inant " and "Market " (Conference Paper) . 
[ 1972] 2 CMLR D 11. 
Above n 42, 50,008 . 
Two cases have been decided since Teleco111 v Co111111erce Co111111ission (CA) that have dealt 
specifically with this issue. They are the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
in Port Nelson Ltd v Co111111erce Co111111ission. See above n -1--L 
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The mam judgment in Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA) was given by 
Richardson J. The most important statement Richardson J makes is: 107 
lc]learly the dominance test sets a rigorous threshold . It is not sufficient that the 
influence be advantageous or powerful. It must be dominant. The word comes from 
the Latin dominus meaning master. Only one person can be dominant in a particular 
aspect of a market at any one time. Not surprisingly standard dictionaries give 
meanings such as "ruling", "governing", "commanding", " reigning", "ascendant" , 
"prevailing" and "paramount". 
He then goes on to criticise the dominance test given in Broadcast Communications 
(cited above). 108 The concern was that words such as 'high' , 'great' , ' large' and 
' appreciable' set too low a threshold as they could easily mean something much less 
than dominance. Instead s 3(8) "requires that the influence which the person 
concerned is in a position to exercise is so high or great or large as to be characterised 
as "a dominant influence" ." 109 Dominance must be given its ordinary meaning and this 
is more than high, large or appreciable market power. 110 
The question this raises is whether the ordinary meaning test is significantly different 
from an economic meaning test. It is arguable that the Court of Appeal simply wanted 
to draw a distinction between ' dominant position' and ' substantial degree of market 
power' in order to illustrate the differences between the New Zealand threshold and 
the Australian threshold . This is implicit from statements such as anything less than a 
"prevailing, commanding, ascendant, governing, primary, principal or leading 
influence" sets too low a standard.11 1 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
there is a practical difference when applying the new test. Three of the Court of 
Appeal judges decided that Telecom was in a position to exert a dominant influence in 
the relevant market thereby agreeing with the High Court. On the other hand 
Richardson J and Hardie Boys J thought Telecom did not exert a dominant influence in 
the relevant market. 
107 
108 
109 
110 
I ll 
Above n 95, -l42. 
See text at n 99. 
Above n 95, 442 . 
Above n 95, Cooke Pat 434, Casey J at 447 and McKay J at 449. 
Above n 95, 434 . 
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If the economic meaning of dominant position creates a threshold that is lower than 
intended by Parliament, as indicated by the Court of Appeal, the problem area will be 
firms that meet the lower threshold but fall short of the higher threshold . The 
difficulty in New Zealand is that most cases decided relating to s 3(8) involve factual 
circumstances where it is either conceded that the firm is dominant or they easily meet 
the higher threshold test. If there is a difference of opinion, as there was in Telecom v 
Commerce Commission (CA), it is normally due to the application of the facts rather 
than a difference in the threshold tests . 
Certain academics are unquestionably of the opm1on that there is a significant 
difference between the two tests. Patterson is one of the most vocal. He states 
that: 11 2 
the Court of Appeal, in rejecting the contention that dominance had a recognized 
economic meaning, and relying instead on dictionary meanings of the word, placed the 
market power threshold far higher than had been intended by the framers of the 
legislation, and as a result has prejudiced the objective of promoting competition in 
New Zealand markets. 
Van Roy is also of the opinion that the threshold is now too high. She states that the 
case "imposed a very high threshold for ' dominant position in a market' - more than 
mere ability to behave largely independently of competitors, but rather requiring a high 
degree of market control." 11 3 
The first case decided after Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA) that addressed 
the issue of the threshold requirement was Commerce Commission v Port Nelson 
Ltd. 114 In that case McGechan J said : 11 5 
11 c 
113 
114 
115 
'Dominance ' includes a qualitative assessment of market power. It involves more than 
"high" market power; more than mere ability to behave " largely" independently of 
Above n 18, 267. 
Y van Roy ·"Abuse ofa Dominant Position ' in New Zealand Competition Legislation" (1995) 
7 ECLR 428, 428. 
(1994) 6 TCLR 406. 
Above n 114, 441-442. 
competitors; and more than power to e1Iect "appreciable" changes in terms of trading. 
It involves a high degree of market control. 
How high? Clearly, not absolute control. There need not be monopoly. There need not 
be ability to act totally without regard to competitors, suppliers, or customers. 
Expression of the required degree of control in terms of mastery - eg as "commanding", 
" ruling" or "governing" - is perhaps to that extent misaligned, and needs to be read 
down ... . However, in the light of the Court of Appeal's rejection of "to a large extent 
independently" as a standard, dominance sets a very high standard of independence. 
To be dominant, the firm must be able to act, within the limits of commercial reality, 
without significant competitive or consumer constraints. ... Not only must a firm be 
able to raise prices without fear of competitive constraint (competitors indeed may 
follow with pleasure) , but must be able to reduce prices or accept more adverse 
conditions with confidence significant competitors, to survive, must follow. To be 
dominant, the firm must be able through market conditions to impose adverse 
conditions of trading upon competitors. 
Greater precision is not possible. 
McGechan J obviously also thought that the new dominance test set a very high 
threshold and he considered that "legislative action may be warranted." 116 He also 
said that when applying the test it is necessary to recognise that it is in an "economic 
context" and "some degree of background commercial realism" is required.11 7 What is 
unclear is when he was applying the test to the facts of Port Nelson whether he was 
using the high threshold test or a ' read down ' version of the test as on either one Port 
Nelson would have been dominant. 
Port Nelson went to the Court of Appeal and the Court in deciding the case again 
addressed the issue of the dominance test. Gault J recognised that Telecom v 
Commerce Commission (CA) had been criticised for setting too high a threshold test 
and went on to explain why the test did not "shift the concept of dominant position 
away from that from which it had been derived - Article 86 of the Treaty ofRome." 11 8 
116 
11 7 
11 8 
Above n 114, 442 . 
Above n 114, 441. 
Above n -l4 , 35 . 
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It is not clear whether the judgment is reasserting the test, merely clarifying it or 
slightly retracting from it. The key to understanding why the Court of Appeal altered 
the test is probably also explained by its recognition that there is a "distinction between 
the concept (dominant position in a market) and the test for its existence (market 
share, vertical and horizontal constraints - which economists assess as elements of 
market power)." 11 9 
Gault J also stated that: 120 
[t]he Telecom case really decided no more than that "dominant" means dominant; that 
in testing for dominant position s 3(8) prescribes certain non-exhaustive matters to be 
considered; that potential competition may impose constraints and that the evidence of 
economists (so long as it is empirically based) will be helpful. A reading of the 
judgments as a whole discloses that although there was concern that the use of 
synonyms and the economists ' expression "high market power" risks substituting a 
lower standard than the term dominant requires, all members of the Court were 
focusing on a market reality capable of practical assessment having regard to the 
market structure and the actual and potential process of workable and effective 
competition. There is no indication in the judgments that a dominant position is one of 
absolute control or monopoly. The very tests in s 3(8)(a), (b) and (c) contemplate less 
than that. 
Richardson Jin Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA) was not rejecting terms such 
as 'large' and 'appreciable' but rather criticising them as being unhelpful because they 
could convey a meaning that is: 121 
inappropriate to reflect dominant position. It is not a rejection of the view that 
dominance reflects the ability to act to a large extent independently across every 
possible interpretation of " to a large extent" . 
Whether the Court of Appeal originally meant to import an extremely high threshold 
into the test for dominant position in the Telecom v Commerce Commission decision is 
119 
120 
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Above n 44, 35. 
Above n 44, 35-36. 
Above n 44, 37. 
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irrelevant. It is clear from the Port Nelson decision that the Court of Appeal has 
slightly relaxed that test. The consequence is that the economic test concepts such as 
' independence of behaviour' may still be used . However, the courts need to be wary 
of lowering the threshold through the use of words such as ' high', 'large' and 
' appreciable ' when considering such concepts. There has to be a substantial amount 
of independence, or whatever other concept is being used, in other words the firm has 
to fit within the far end of any scale to be considered dominant. Perhaps the best way 
of addressing this issue is to apply any threshold criteria, concept or test and then step 
back and consider whether the firm could really be considered ' dominant '. 
The fact that the phrase chosen differs significantly from the Australian prov1s1on 
indicates that Parliament did indeed want the threshold to be higher than the Australian 
threshold. Whether it was meant to be as high as it is currently perceived is something 
that needs to be addressed at the legislative and policy levels rather than by the 
judiciary. If this means that the number of firms that are currently considered to be 
within the definition of a 'dominant firm ' is less than Parliament originally intended, 
then it is up to the Legislature to change the provision. 
(c) Important factors in deciding 'dominant position in a market ' 
A court will consider various factors when deciding whether a person is in a dominant 
position or not. The starting point, as discussed above, is s 3(8)(a)-(c) with the 
expanded list or explanation from the News Ltd decision also being important. 122 An 
analysis of each individual factor is not possible in this paper. Instead specific factors 
that are either controversial or problematic are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The first issue relates to s 3(8)(a) of the test for dominance.123 This is commonly 
referred to as the structure test for dominance. There has been some support for 
promoting this factor above the rest. In other words if a firm has a majority of the 
market share it is presumed to be dominant. There are problems associated with 
defining what is meant by market share, however, the European Court of Justice has 
122 
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Above n 91 , 51. This decision is discussed above in Part III C 3 (a) - The Statutory Test for 
Dominant Position in a Market. 
See text a n 85 for the full quotation of the section. The provision states that " ... regard shall 
be had to- (a) The share of the market, the technical knowledge, the access to materials or 
capital of that person or that person together with any interconnected body corporate." 
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simply applied this kind of test to Article 86 cases. 124 The difficulty with this 
presumption is that it moves the s 3 6 contravention away from behaviour towards 
structure. The other elements of the section still have to be fulfilled, but it does imply 
a policy change. The attitude of the New Zealand courts is that, although market 
share is an important factor in determining dominance and the more share the firm has 
the more likely it is to be dominant, this is not the determinative test. 125 This is 
especially important when it is shown that market share does not necessarily equate 
with power. 126 Korah states that "[e]ven a sole supplier may be constrained by fear of 
entry and charge only competitive prices where barriers to entry are not high; in which 
case, the market is already operating competitively." 127 
The previous quote introduces the next issue - barriers to entry. This issue is inversely 
related to the issue of potential competition. The fewer barriers to entry that there are 
the more likely it is that there is potential competition. Some examples of barriers to 
entry are; government protection, start up costs, control of the raw materials and 
vertical integration. It has sometimes been argued that considering barriers to entry is 
of paramount importance. 128 It is apparent from the decisions regarding s 3(8) and s 
36 that the courts do not focus on one factor as being the determinative test. A 
variety of factors are considered and this is evidenced by the in-depth analysis given in 
Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA). 129 Richardson J also addressed the time 
frame requirement when considering potential competition. He considered that it is 
necessary to: 130 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
focus on market performance over a sufficient run of time in order to comprehend 
whether and to what ex.1ent it is workably competitive. On that approach the Court was 
firmly of the view that a prospective development should not be disregarded merely 
because it entailed looking two years into the future. 
See The EEC Approach to "Dominance " and "Market " above n 103, 9-11 ; also see V Korab 
"Concept of a Dominant Position Within the Meaning of Article 86" (1980) 17 CML Rev 395, 
399. 
Above n 95, 444. 
For more information on this aspect of market power see above n 19. 
Above n 12.+, 396. 
J Land "Monopolisation: The Practical Implications of Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986" 
(1988) 18 VUWLR 51 , 59. 
Above n 95, Cooke Pat 434-435, Richardson J at 443-445 . 
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Another issue that has been discussed reasonably often is whether it is necessary that 
there is an absence of competition before dominance can occur. Section 3(8) 
recognises that there is the possibility of competition in the market as indicated by 
paragraph (b) which uses the phrase ' constrained by the conduct of competitors or 
potential competitors in that market' . The issue arose because of certain statements 
which seemed to indicate that an absence of competition is a necessary condition.131 
The Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Port Nelson and stated that: 132 
[c]learly there were matters indicating that PNL was not totally unconstrained but that 
is not a necessary requirement for dominant influence . .. . The very focus of s 36 is a 
person in a dominant position acting to deter or eliminate a competitor. The section 
contemplates a dominant position in which there still is a perceived need to act 
aggressively. A dominant position is not one that is so controlling that it is 
impenetrable. 
It is clear that no single factor assumes more importance than the others when 
considering dominant position. All three of the factors under 3(8) must be taken into 
consideration and are of equal value, depending on the factual circumstances. It is 
necessary, however, to realise that this analysis has to been done within a dynamic and 
economic environment. The Court of Appeal states that :133 
[a]s is plain from s 3(8) in which the legislature appears to have distilled the essential 
elements of market power, a dynamic analysis is required of the market, its structure, 
the concentration of participants, their behaviour and that expected of potential 
entrants, the nature of the activities encompassed and general circumstances of supply 
to, and by, the market. 
(d) Can more than one person be in a dominant position? 
An interesting issue is whether two or more firms could collude in such a way that 
together they hold a dominant position. Utton believes that this can occur in practice 
131 
132 
133 
See New Zealand Afagic Millions above n 7. 
Above n 44, 40. 
Above n 44, 38. 
as firms can secretly collude to act together or tacitly agree to apply similar prices. 134 
Hampton also thinks that this is possible because: 135 
two or more unrelated firms, each of whom is individually not in a position to dominate 
a market but who together control a dominant portion of the market, [could] act to 
protect that position by restraining competition. 
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The problem may also occur where there are two extremely large firms in a market 
which are not restrained from anticompetitive conduct by each other. 136 
Hampton concludes that the Act does not provide for the control of this type of 
situation as if "the legislature had intended s. 36 to apply to joint dominance it could 
simply have used the words 'one or more persons' instead of 'a person'. 137 This 
approach is also supported by case law. In Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA) 
Richardson J specifically states that "[ o ]nly one person can be dominant in a particular 
aspect of a market at any one time." 138 Cooke P also alludes to the impossibility of 
more than one person being dominant in a market at a time. He states that: 139 
[c]learly there could be no more than one dominant influence over each of the aspects 
of a market specified in the Act - " the production, acquisition, supply or price of goods 
or services" - but it may be theoretically conceivable, for instance, that one person could 
be in a position to exercise a dominant influence over supply, while another was in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence over price. Yet probably that would be an 
uncommon situation. 
There was no question of more than one person being dominant in Telecom v 
Commerce Commission (CA), so it is difficult to conclude that these comments are 
absolutely decisive on the point. If the right facts came before the Court of Appeal it 
134 
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is still conceivable that it could decide that more than one person can be dominant in 
the same market. This would necessitate using a more liberal interpretation of 
'association of persons' in the definition of person, but it is possible. However, if 
collusion is proven between the two or more firms involved it may be far more 
straightforward to take a claim under the general anti-competitive provision - s 27. 
The difficulty is that the firms would not be dominant in the market as a single entity 
(unless they somehow come within the definition of person) but rather are dominant in 
their collusive behaviour. It is the combined behaviour of the firms that gives the 
dominance and it is a contradiction to call each firm dominant, especially with respect 
to the Court of Appeal articulation of the test. It would be far more arguable under 
the Australian Act as all that is required is a 'substantial degree of market power' and 
it is conceivable that this could be held by more than one firm. 
D Use of a Dominant Position 
1 The statute 
The requirement that the person with a dominant position in a market 'has used that 
position' for one of the proscribed purposes is the equivalent of the s 46 Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) requirement that the person 'take advantage of his, her or 
its substantial degree of power in a market for one of the proscribed purposes. 140 This 
means that Australian case law on 'take advantage of has great relevance for the New 
Zealand position. 
Much controversy surrounds this particular element of s 36. It is arguable that there is 
no need to address use as a separate element let alone analyse it to the extent it has 
been. It is conceivable from reading the statute that use is a completely neutral term 
that does not require further analysis and it could be replaced by a phrase such as 'shall 
not act for the purpose of . It simply serves as a causal connector. 
The whole problem arose subsequent to the Queensland w;re case where it was 
decided that 'take advantage of did not have a pejorative meaning.141 The only 
140 
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reason that this was an issue is because prior to the decision it was believed that 'take 
advantage of required an extra element of malicious intention. It is possible that the 
New Zealand Courts may never have focused on the meaning of use but for the 
discussion of this issue and the High Court decision that 'take advantage of was the 
same as 'use' . 
This may have lead to other problems because if use was merely a neutral term to 
represent a causal connection between the conduct of the firm and its dominance it 
could mean that the purpose requirement was too wide in scope and too much 
conduct that is actually competitive may be caught bys 36. On the other hand, a focus 
on use may mean that the scope of the section is too narrow and not enough conduct 
is caught bys 36. Gault J assesses this dilemma and stated that "it is perhaps timely to 
caution against substituting a test helpful in applying the statutory rule for the rule 
itself" 142 
2 The Queensland Wire decision and the Geotherm decision 
As mentioned above, prior to the Queensland Wire decision it was unusual for New 
Zealand courts to even consider 'use' as a requirement. The High Court in Auckland 
Regional Authordy1 43 did not address the issue at all and the New Zealand Magic 
Millions 144 case focused on the requirement of purpose.145 However, the issues of use 
and purpose were separated to some extent in Union Shipping. 146 By 1992 it was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal that "[t)here will be circumstances in which the use 
of the market position and the purpose are not easily separated but the two 
requirements must be kept in mind." 147 The question that arises from this statement is: 
what exactly is required under the use element? 
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Various formulations of a test for use have been suggested by writers in the area or 
outlined in case law.148 One of the most commonly cited is from Natwest Australia 
Bank Ltd v Baral Gerrard Strapping Systems Pty Ltd. 149 The Court stated that : 150 
[t]here must be a causal connection between the conduct alleged and the market power 
pleaded such that it can be shown that the conduct is a use of that power. In many 
cases the connection may be demonstrated by showing reliance by the contravenor upon 
its market power to insulate it from the sanctions that competition would ordinarily 
visit upon its conduct. 
Van Roy agrees with this analysis of use and states that: 151 
[i]t should be sufficient to recognise that the word ' use ' merely provides the causal 
connection between the conduct of the firm and its market power/dominance, and leave 
it up to the courts to decide what best provides this causal connection in any particular 
case. 
There is a difference between what the test should be and what it is currently. The 
decision in Queensland w;re has added to the controversy in this area because it has 
been interpreted by other courts and writers as giving a test where the inquiry is: 
whether the conduct was only possible because of the market power or dominance 
that the firm has. 152 Some writers believe that this is too narrow a test and that it was 
not at all what was intended by the High Court.153 Rather, the High Court addressed 
use in the market context and was still regarding it as a causal connection. They did 
not simply look at the conduct in question but also the effect of the conduct. 
Even if the narrow interpretation of the Queensland W;re test is correct it may only be 
illustrative. Van Melle states that: 154 
I 48 
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[t]he Queensland Wire test (arguably correctly) states that market power must have been 
"used" if a firm without such power could not have acted in the same way, but this does 
not in itself preclude a finding that market power could also have been "used" even if 
the same conduct was possible by a firm lacking market power. 
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A quite different situation arose in Geotherm and as a consequence a different test was 
articulated. Instead of looking to the conduct only being possible because of 
dominance the Court of Appeal said that use occurred if "it is the dominant position 
that gives the statements the force amounting to deterrence." 155 The case involved 
conduct outside of the market and so did not require the same kind of analysis as 
conduct directly affecting the market. 156 This is similar to the approach of the 
European Col.irt of Justice in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd v European Commission. 157 
Therefore prior to the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear there was more than 
one test used to help define what is required for the ' use' element of the section. The 
Queensland Wire test and the Geotherm test are simply two examples of these types 
of tests and help to illustrate that the courts were willing to adapt their thinking 
according to the type of situation that they were facing . It could be argued that this 
meant there was very little certainty for firms with regard to 'use' of a dominant 
position, however, the courts were maintaining flexibility in this regard . It is difficult 
to foresee every type of conduct that a dominant firm could undertake and it is 
probable that the courts did not want to sacrifice flexibility for the sake of certainty. 
Also, provided any dominant firm did not have the requisite purpose, regardless of 
whether it satisfied the use test or not, it would not be contravening the section. 
3 The Privy Council test 
The highest authority on the test for use is the Privy Council decision in Telecom 
Co,poration of New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd. 158 The focus changed 
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completely after this decision with huge implications. The test as stated by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson is: 159 
it cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position "uses" that position for 
the purposes of s 36 [if] he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant position but 
otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted. 
This test has been severely criticised both in terms of its impact on unilateral anti-
competitive conduct and the way it undermines the Government's regime of 'light-
hearted regulation' .160 Van Roy has expressed dissatisfaction with the Privy Council 
test in at least two articles. 161 She believes that the test "imposed a very restrictive 
interpretation on the meaning of 'use' of a dominant position by excluding from its 
ambit all behaviour which a non-dominant firm in the same circumstances would have 
engaged in." 162 Further: 163 
The court did not consider the full implications which such a high threshold could have 
on cases under section 36. Taken literally, if the test for ' use' excludes all conduct that 
a non-dominant firm would do, there must be very little conduct that would not be 
excluded. For there is little which can be done by a firm with the commanding 
influence required by ' dominance ' that cannot also be done by a firm which meets the 
lower Australian threshold (large degree of market power) or the former New Zealand 
threshold (can act to a large extent independently). It is to be hoped that the New 
Zealand courts continue to avoid this complication. for to take account of it would 
surely mean the complete demise of section 36. 
As discussed in Part III C above, the threshold requirement for dominant position is 
quite high. When this high threshold is combined with the Privy Council test for use 
there is an extreme effect. Firms that have potentially high market power that do not 
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meet this high threshold are considered to be non-dominant. When this point is added 
to the fact that the Privy Council test minimises the amount or scope of conduct that 
contravenes s 3 6, the overall effect is that little unilateral conduct will be proscribed by 
the section. 
Unlike the Queensland Wire test, which arguably relies on purpose requirements and 
is only illustrative, the Privy Council test is theoretically exhaustive.164 It implies that 
if the conduct undertaken by the dominant firm is conduct which a non dominant firm 
could undertake then there is no use of the dominant position. The test obviously does 
not allow for situations where the conduct may be undertaken by any firm, but 
because it is undertaken by a dominant firm has anti-competitive effects. The conduct 
that breached the Australian provision in Queensland Wire was refusal to supply, 
clearly conduct that any firm could have undertaken. The conduct of Electricorp in 
Geotherm is also of this type. Predatory pricing, although more difficult to prove, also 
falls into this category of conduct. 
There is the possibility that the Privy Council in articulating the test for 'use' 
deliberately used the word 'would' in order to differentiate between conduct that any 
firm could undertake from conduct that only a dominant firm would undertake. For 
example, only a dominant firm would risk refusing to supply a potential competitor 
because in a more competitive market the competitor would simply go elsewhere. So 
although a non-dominant firm could refuse to supply, it would not. However, there is 
again a counter argument, the non-dominant firm would refuse to supply if it did not 
have excess capacity to fill the competitor's order. So the argument becomes less 
forceful because the conduct at issue is something that any firm might undertake. In 
Port Nelson (CA) Gault J quoted the Privy Council test as outlined above, and then 
proceeded to use 'could' when assessing the conduct at issue. 165 As the two words 
were used interchangeably it indicates that any distinction is based solely on semantics. 
4 Intentions of Parliament 
Given that the combination of the dominant position test and the use test means that 
the amount of unilateral conduct that contravenes s 3 6 is severely restricted, one has 
164 
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to ask whether this is what Parliament intended. Hill and Jones believe that the central 
concern of s 36 is purpose and use is quite neutral. 166 The Commerce Act was 
enacted well after the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and although the Act is based 
on the Australian Act it is significant that Parliament did not use 'take advantage of in 
s 36. The difficulty is interpreting the significance as this could merely have been to 
avoid any pejorative connotations. 
The focus of the Privy Council test is the nature of the conduct itself rather than the 
purpose or effect of the conduct. It is conceded that if the action is something that 
only a dominant firm could undertake, for example charging above cost to achieve 
monopoly profits, that this will be a use of dominant position. 167 However, it is still 
necessary to address the issue of purpose. There is nothing wrong, according to s 36, 
with charging below cost unless it involves one of the proscribed purposes. 168 In most 
cases it is the purpose that distinguishes between legitimate competition and conduct 
that contravenes the Act. With respect, it appears that the Privy Council has forgotten 
the objective of the purpose element. Instead ' use ' is taken to be the defining element 
of the section and this leads to such a narrow interpretation of use that the section is 
rendered almost meaningless. The explanation for this unusual interpretation of ' use' 
may be that the Privy Council were in no doubt that Telecom had the requisite purpose 
and yet did not want to find against them. 169 This left a finding of no ' use ' as the only 
possible option for preventing fulfilment of the requirements of the section. 
A simple conduct oriented test is too sterile. It neglects other important aspects such 
as the market context and the purpose of the conduct. By taking into account these 
aspects a true use of market power analysis can be undertaken and s 3 6 will retain the 
power to prevent unilateral conduct of dominant firms that has the required proscribed 
purpose. The difficulty is how to get around the Privy Council test and this is 
discussed further below. 
166 
167 
168 
169 
BM Hill and MR Jones Competitive Trading in New Zealand: The Com111erce A ct 1986 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1986) 77. 
This was the issue in all three of the Clear v Te /eco111 decisions as the argument centred 
around whether the Baumol-Willig mle allowed for the charging of monopoly rents within the 
costing regime imposed on Clear. 
An example of this type of conduct is shown by the facts in Eastern Express Pty Li111ited v 
General Newspapers Pty Limited (1991) ATPR 41-128. Predatory pricing was argued and 
discussed in the case but Wilcox J held that the facts did not prove this claim. 
Above n 8, 403 . 
38 
5 Reinterpreting the Privy Council test for use 
Privy Council decisions from the New Zealand jurisdiction are binding on our courts. 
Therefore there are very few ways to avoid applying the Privy Council test for use. 
McGechan J had a difficult time when applying the test to conduct amounting to 
pricing lower than cost in Port Nelson. 110 Ultimately it was decided that this was a 
contravention of s 27 rather than the perhaps more natural option - s 36. The reason 
was that according to the Privy Council test a non-dominant firm may also have 
undertaken the conduct that allegedly breached s 36 and therefore there was no 'use' . 
The conduct that McGechan did consider to be a breach of s 36 may also have not 
been a real use as outlined by the Privy Council test. It appears that McGechan J took 
into consideration the context and also implicitly the purpose of the conduct. It is 
debatable whether this is possible under the test although the words ' otherwise in the 
same circumstances' may provide this opportunity. Van Roy does not agree with this 
proposition as: 171 
had that been the intention of the Privy Council, it could not have decided that the 
imposition of a pricing rule which could be used by competitive firms in normal 
competition, but would only be used for anti-competitive purposes by firms with real 
market power, was not a 'use ' of a dominant position. 
The counter argument is that the Privy Council may not have even considered the 
argument and perhaps did not actually intend to narrow the rule to the extent that it is 
narrowed . 
Another way to remove the adverse consequences of the Privy Council test is to try to 
restrict the ratio of the case to the facts . The narrowing could be to cases where there 
is a pricing issue - as this is the issue in the three Telecom v Clear cases. There was 
no question of access to facilities or predatory pricing or any of the commonly 
considered ' abuses ' of dominant position. The decision could be narrowed even more 
to situations where the issue is monopoly pricing of access to facilities where the 
supplier of the facility is also a competitor. However, this may be too artificial. 
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Another possibility is to consider the nature of the industry - telecommunications and 
access to networks in view of recent deregulations of a state monopoly. Again this 
may go too far and as a consequence look artificial. 
The Court of Appeal implies that there is room to manoeuvre around the test. It 
briefly considered the Privy Council test in Port Nelson and stated that: 172 
f w]hile it is not easy to see why use of a dominant position should not be determined 
simply as a question of fact without the need to postulate artificial scenarios. we are 
content in this case to adopt that approach, as did the High Court. 
This is simply a different way of expressing Gault J's point that "it is perhaps timely to 
caution against substituting a test helpful in applying the statutory rule for the rule 
itself." 173 Given that the Court of Appeal simply accepted McGechan J's analysis of 
the test and his decision in Port Nelson it is difficult to predict exactly how the Court 
of Appeal will apply the Privy Council test in future . A possibility is that the Court 
will use the would/could distinction discussed above.174 
The most straightforward but perhaps not the easiest way to deal with the test is 
through legislative changes. Parliament would be able to determine exactly what kind 
of conduct is meant to be proscribed by s 36. This would require deciding whether a 
test for use should be enacted. The difficulty is that it is unlikely that one all 
encompassing test would resolve all issues. This was the beauty of the pre Telecom v 
Clear case law, it allowed for different tests or considerations in different situations. 
A possibility would be to include some form of two tier test that would take into 
account conduct that only dominant firms could undertake but also other conduct 
when dominance would strengthen or achieve the proscribed purpose. Two examples 
of this kind of test are given in Appendix C. 'Use ' could also be defined in the Act as 
merely a causal link as shown by Natwest Australia Bank Ltd. 175 If combined with 
some form of statement that purpose is the important element when considering s 36 
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this may resolve any residual difficulties. 176 In fact the whole issue of dominant 
position could be addressed at the same time. 
E Purpose 
1 The statute 
The last constituent element of s 36 is purpose. The proscribed purposes are 
specifically outlined ins 36(l)(a)-(c). The requisite purposes are: 177 
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct in that 
or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
The ultimate effect of the conduct is irrelevant under s 36 as long as the requisite 
purpose is shown. Under s 2( 5)(b) a person is deemed to have the purpose if it is one 
of the purposes or reasons that person engaged in the conduct and it was a substantial 
purpose or reason. Therefore it does not have to be the sole purpose of the dominant 
firm. Section 2(1A) defines substantial as meaning "real or of substance". A hostile 
intention is not required, provided the "anti-competitive effects are within the 
defendant's purpose, questions of morality and motive become irrelevant. " 178 
More then mere intention is required to satisfy this element, the purpose has to be the 
object or aim of the perpetrator.179 However, there is dicta which supports the 
proposition that if the conduct undertaken has the inevitable consequence equivalent 
to satisfying one of the purposes, it is sufficient to show the perpetrator had that 
intended purpose. 180 The Court of Appeal in Clear v Telecom stated that where a 
competitor will not be able to enter the market without access to facilities the 
dominant firm holds "the anticompetitive purpose is to be inferred from the 
inevitability of the consequences of refusing to deal except on terms that lead to 
I 76 
177 
I 78 
I 79 
180 
Above 11 161 , 60. 
The foll text of s 36 is included above in Part III A - Introduction and Approach. 
Above n 10, 84. 
Above 11 10, 83. 
Neiv Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields Ltd (19891 3 NZLR 158, 162. 
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competitive disadvantage." 181 Land disagrees with this dicta, stating that "[t]he 
intention to do an act which it is known will have the consequence of eliminating a 
trader from the market is not enough." 182 However, a distinction may be drawn 
between an inevitable consequence that occurs due to another plausible purpose, for 
example because the competitor is a bad credit risk, and an inevitable consequence 
when there is no other plausible explanation.183 
Sections 36(l)(a)-(c) are written in such away as to give as wide a coverage of 
unilateral purposes as is possible. The section does not include a competition test and 
therefore "it is possible for a firm to achieve a prohibited purpose without actually 
lessening competition." 184 There is impact on competition in a much wider sense than 
is contemplated by the other restrictive trade practices provisions. 
The three paragraphs give three different types of prohibited purpose, although 
unilateral conduct undertaken by a dominant firm will usually fit within more than one 
of the types. Paragraphs (a) and (c) are slightly narrower in that they simply address 
stopping someone from entering the market or removing someone from the market. 
The scope of the conduct envisaged by para (b) is much wider as it addresses the 
actual conduct of the parties within the market. Van Roy states that para (b) would: 185 
cover conduct which has the purpose of forcing others to act in a way in which they 
would not freely choose to act. For example, a dominant manufacturer might demand 
that its distributors stock only its brand of products (ie, exclusive dealing). 
Quite often the courts will decide whether a dominant firm has the requisite purpose 
by analysing whether there is any other legitimate commercial reason for undertaking 
the conduct in question. 186 This is because although sometimes it may appear that a 
dominant firm has an anti-competitive purpose, there may be a legitimate reason for 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (1992) 5 TCLR 413, 437 . Referred to in the text as Clear v Telecom (CA). 
Above n 128, 70 . Also see ID Heydon and BG Donald Trade Practices Law: Restrictive Trade Practices, Deceptive Conduct and Consumer Protection (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1989) para 5400, p 2621. 
This is also supported by the decision in Union Shipping above n 7, 707. 
Above n 19, 16. 
Above n 10, 158. 
Above n 114, 556. 
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the conduct undertaken, for example a refusal to supply may be due to the competitor 
being a bad credit risk. 
2 An objective or subjective test for pwpose? 
A subsidiary issue is whether an objective or subjective test is to be used when 
determining purpose. 187 There is some argument that whereas ss 27 and 29 require an 
objective standard for purpose because contracts arrangements and understandings are 
involved, s 36 requires a subjective standard because it is the actual firm's purpose that 
is being questioned. There are various cases that address the objective subjective 
dichotomy, 188 with the balance of favour being with a subjective purpose for s 36. 189 
However, the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson stated that: 190 
[m]uch has been written on this distinction which generally is unimportant in practice. 
There will be very little difference in most cases between ascertaining subjective 
purpose by inference from what was said and done and ascribing objectively a purpose 
from evidence of what was said and done .... So far as concerns s 36, in the absence of 
further argument we incline to the conclusion McGechan J reached after reviewing the 
authorities that purpose may be established or negatived on either a subjective or an 
objective analysis. 
Clearly no decision will be made unless there is a case where it will make a difference 
whether a objective or subjective purpose is required. 
187 
188 
189 
190 
See A Boutel "Purpose in the Commerce Act" in Commerce Commission Current Issues in New Zealand Competition and Consumer Law (Wellington, 1993) vol 5, p 109: also see JM November The Meaning of ·'Use" of a Dominant Position in a Afarket for a Proscribed "'Purpose": The Jurisprudence of Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 1986 (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington. 1992). 
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3 Inferring purpose 
Prior to the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear it was reasonable to infer that if 
there was an anti-competitive purpose then there was use . The High Court of 
Australia, in Queensland Wire, stated that :191 
it is significant that sec. 46(1) already contains an anti-competitive purpose element. It 
stipulates that an infringement may be found only where the market power is taken 
advantage of for a purpose proscribed in para. (a), (b) or (c). It is these purpose 
provisions which define what uses of market power constitute misuses. 
The Court of Appeal also indicated that this approach is correct. 192 In Geotherm 
Gault J stated that "[t]he distinction between vigorous legitimate competition by a 
corporation with substantial market power and conduct that contravenes the section is 
the purpose of the conduct." 193 However, the Privy Council takes a different point of 
view. According to their Lordships: 194 
[a]lthough it is legitimate to infer "purpose" from use of a dominant position producing 
an anticompetitive effect, it may be dangerous to argue the converse ie, that because the 
anticompetitive purpose was present, therefore there was use of a dominant position. 
To infer purpose from use leads to the situation where a dominant firm could have an 
anti-competitive purpose but would not breach s 36 because it acted in a way that a 
non-dominant firm would or could have acted. Therefore if dominant firms are careful 
in how they achieve any anti-competitive purposes they will not contravene s 36. It is 
also unlikely that they will contravene any other section because s 36 is the only 
section aimed at unilateral conduct. 
The Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth) has a specific section that provides that purpose 
may be ascertained simply by inference from the conduct undertaken or other 
circumstances. 195 There is no equivalent provision in the Commerce Act probably 
191 
192 
193 
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Above n 42, 50,010. 
Above n 181 , 437. 
Above n 147, 649. 
Above n 8, 402. 
Section 46(7) is quoted in full in Appendix A. 
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because "it is clear that in the absence of such a provision the courts have accepted as 
evidence of purpose inferences taken from the conduct of the dominant firm in 
question." 196 In light of the comments by the Privy Council discussed above it may be 
necessary to include such a provision in future . 
4 Pwpose and the Telecom v Clear trilogy 
The three cases involving Telecom and Clear that related to the use of the Baumol-
Willig rule for pricing access to Telecom's network are an interesting illustration of 
the application of the use and purpose tests. 197 There was no question of whether 
Telecom was in a dominant position or not as counsel conceded that point. 198 
Therefore the issues were whether Telecom had used its dominant position and if so, 
was it for one of the proscribed purposes. The High Court decision indicated that 
there was 'use' but no 'purpose', 199 the Court of Appeal found both 'use' and 
'purpose' ,200 however, the Privy Council found 'purpose' but no 'use' .201 Indeed, 
stated like this, it is hard to believe that all three decisions were based on the same 
facts. 
The primary issue was whether the application of the rule included an element of 
monopoly profits being charged to the competitor and if so whether that was sufficient 
to contravene s 36. It is clear that s 36 is "not aimed at mere monopoly charging or 
terms of dealing", 202 it is only when that type of monopoly pricing affects a competitor 
that the section can be used. Both the High Court and the Privy Council decided that 
although monopoly profits may be included, they accepted the evidence of some of the 
economic experts that those profits could be competed out of the pricing by an 
efficient competitor. 203 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
203 
See Review of the Commerce Act 1986: A Discussion Paper above n 49, 33. 
The Baumol-Willig rule is one of the many issues in this line of cases. however. it is the focus 
of this part of the paper. 
Above n 79. 194. 
Above n 79. 217. 
Above n 181 , Cooke Pat 416, Gault J at -l37. 
Above n 8, 402-403 . 
It is clear that s 36 is "not aimed at mere monopoly charging or terms of dealing ... " Above n 
79, 197. It is only when that type of monopoly pricing affects a competitor that the section can 
be used. 
Above n 8, 406 ; also above n 198, 214. 
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The Privy Council started from a different point to the other decisions because it 
decided initially that Telecom clearly had one of the proscribed purposes. The Privy 
Council stated that it was a hopeless task to argue that Telecom did not have an anti-
competitive purpose because: 204 
it would be most improbable that Telecom lacked the purpose to deter its bitter rival, 
Clear, but also because its past conduct and certain of its internal memoranda show that 
in fact it did have that purpose. 
This seems to focus on the general attitude of Telecom to Clear rather than the 
specific conduct in question. The Privy Council then considered whether there was 
'use' of a dominant position. 205 As a "hypothetical supplier in a perfectly contestable 
market" would use the Baumol-Willig rule, there was no ' use ' of a dominant 
position.206 This decision was probably influenced by three factors. The first is that 
the Privy Council had already decided that there was ' purpose'. The second factor is 
that charging of monopoly prices is not generally proscribed by the section.207 Thirdly, 
if it is desirable to eliminate the charging of monopoly profits, s 36 does not have to be 
mis-interpreted to achieve this as the price control provisions of the Act specifically 
allow for it. 208 
The High Court's decision is quite different although it achieves exactly the same 
result. The possibility of including monopoly profits was again the major issue the 
court had to address. The difference in this decision is that the court linked the ability 
to compete out the monopoly profits and therefore enhance competition to the 
purpose requirement. It stated that: 209 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
[i]f the defendant's conduct is more likely than not, in light of available alternatives, to 
improve competition, the defendant cannot be said to be in breach of the purpose 
requirements of s 36. There is an improvement in competition when there is an 
Above n 8, 402 . 
See discussion above in Part III D - Use of a Dominant Position. 
Above n 8, 406. 
Section 36 will only apply to monopoly pricing if it involves some form of vertically integrated 
firm that is competing with the person it is supplying. 
Above n 8, 407 . 
Above n 79, 217. 
enhancement of an efficient competitive process. Effect does not necessarily imply 
purpose. But Telecom's intent can be inferred from an analysis of the true character of 
the charging regime it proposes. 
5 Comb;n;ng use and purpose 
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Most of the difficulties associated with the tests for purpose and use are due to the 
artificial separation of the elements. The consequence of addressing each element 
individually is that the courts are loath to use a test that may include conduct that is 
not within the general purpose of the provision. Therefore great care is taken to 
ensure that the test for the specific element is not so wide as to include behaviour that 
the section as a whole would not include. This can lead to an extremely narrow test 
and ignores the fact that the provision needs to be read as a whole. 21 0 This is 
particularly evident when analysing ' purpose' and ' use' as the two elements are 
interdependent. This is clearly indicated by the Privy Council when it stated that: 211 
[t]he use of a dominant position otherwise than for one of those purposes does not 
constitute a breach. Contrawise, the fact that a person has acted in order to achieve one 
of the purposes (a), (b) or (c) does not constitute a breach unless he has used his 
dominant position to achieve those purposes. 
They may have to be considered separately to ensure that both requirements are met, 
but the overall emphasis must be on their joint contribution. The Court of Appeal 
supported this proposition in stating that: 212 
21 0 
211 
212 
[i]t is the purpose of the conduct which distinguishes what is proscribed from what is 
legitimate. If the conduct in question does not involve use of a dominant position in the 
market, purpose alone will not contravene. In most circumstances the use and the 
purpose will not be easily separated and need not be. 
For example the test for 'use ' discussed above in Part III D 3 - The Privy Council Test. 
Above n 8, 402 . 
Above n 181 , 429. 
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This is also supported by the approach of Gault J in Port Nelson .213 He stated that 
whether a dominant firm has used its position should be a question of fact rather than 
being decided by the use of "artificial scenarios". 214 However, the rest of the judgment 
addresses the two elements together. 
F Summary 
The current judicial approach deterrruning whether s 36 has been breached is to split 
the provision into three elements and decide if each element has been satisfied. The 
three elements that need to be shown are:215 
(i) a person who has a dominant position in a market; 
(ii) who has used that dominant position 
(iii) for the purpose of the matters referred to in subpara (a), (b) and (c) of subs (1). 
The relevant market is deterrruned by reference to; the constraints on the dorrunant 
firm, substitutability of demand and supply, and the four dimensions of the market. 216 
Ultimately it is a question of fact. Section 3(8) defines dorrunant position and the 
relevant judicial test is as outlined in Telecom v Commerce Commission (CA) as 
refined by the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson. It is a high threshold test that requires 
more than ' high market power' or the ability to behave independently of competitors. 
Use is deterrruned by reference to the Privy Council test in Telecom v Clear. This 
requires that the conduct undertaken by the dominant firm be something that a non 
dominant firm in the same circumstances would not have done. It is an exhaustive test 
that has the effect of severely restricting the conduct that rrught possibly satisfy the use 
element. Finally, the purpose element requires that the purpose of the dominant firm 
be a substantial purpose but not necessarily the only purpose. It is also irrelevant 
whether purpose is found by objective or subjective means. 
213 
214 
215 
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Above n 44. 
Above n 44, 42. 
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The four dimensions are: product; function ; geographic; and time. This is discussed fully 
above in Part III C 2 - Market. 
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All three elements have to be satisfied before a breach of s 36 will be found. The next 
part of the paper addresses the issue of whether a particular practice, which was 
originally a possible breach of s 36, is still arguably a breach under the current 
interpretation and application of the section. 
IV SHAM LITIGATION 
A Introduction and Definition of Sham Litigation 
Normal market activity relates directly to the production, acquisition, supply or pricing 
of goods and services. There are many practices that a dominant firm can undertake 
that do not fall within the normal categories of market activity and consequently will 
only indirectly affect the market, competition and competitors. The issue that is 
addressed in this part of the paper is whether these practices contravene s 36. 
Examples of these types of practices are; statements of policy,21 7 denial of access to 
advice,218 delay in contract negotiations, 219 and overuse of litigation. The focus is on 
the use of litigation by dominant firms for anti-competitive reasons. This will be 
referred to as sham litigation _22° 
There are vanous reasons why a dominant firm would wish to undertake sham 
litigation . The most obvious is that it will raise the costs of the other party. It is not 
necessarily used to eliminate the other party completely from the market. It may only 
be used to slow their production down, or to increase their prices, or to delay their 
entry into the market. If a dominant firm is reaping monopoly profits then it may well 
be worth their while to undertake this sham litigation even if it is costly:221 
21 7 
218 
219 
220 
221 
[uJsually, it would be commercial commonsense in a competitive marketplace to not 
risk the costs of anti-competitive litigation where even a positive result would be 
Above n 147, 650 . 
Above n 147,652. 
Above n 181 , -H5. 
An alternative definition of sham litigation is where "a defendant has used legitimate rights 
for anticompetitive purposes". See AK Laurenson Sham Litigation and its Relevance to 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 (LLB (Hons) Legal Writing, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1992) 3. 
SJ Weisman "Commercial Power and Competitor Litigation" (1996) 24 ABLR 85, 87. 
unlikely to change the dynamics of the market. However, as the balance of power in a 
market shifts towards larger entities, desirable competition techniques, such as reducing 
prices and improving products and services, may become more costly to a dominant 
business than aggressive anti-competitive use of court or administrative processes. At 
times, an instigator might only be able to justify and sustain litigation in a commercial 
sense because of its market power. 
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B Early Recognition of Sham Litigation in the Courts 
Instances of sham litigation have been recognised in Australia, 222 Canada223 and the 
United States of America.224 The Australian case law initially focused on enforcement 
of intellectual property rights and use of contractual rights. The line of cases pre 
Queensland Wire tended towards the view that "to exercise in good faith an 
extraneous legal right, though the effect may be to lessen, or even eliminate, 
competition is to take advantage of that right, not of market power. "225 However, the 
more modern approach is that taking legal proceedings may be use of a dominant 
position in some circumstances. 226 This reflects the view that "the exercise of 
contractual rights cannot sensibly be looked at in isolation from the circumstances in 
which they were brought into being or the circumstances in which they were 
exercised. "227 
The US has a specific and reasonably well developed doctrine that deals with sham 
litigation. The New Zealand courts are reluctant to import US doctrines as evidenced 
by the discussion of the essential facilities doctrine in Union Shipping228 and also the 
discussion of the sham litigation doctrine in both Geotherm229 and Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd. 230 Therefore this 
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paper proceeds on the basis of first principles rather than by simply importing a foreign 
doctrine. 23 1 
There are two cases in New Zealand that specifically deal with sham litigation.232 
They are the Geotherm decision233 and the Telecom v Clear decision. 234 The first 
obstacle to overcome was whether it was possible that non-normal market activity 
could even be considered under s 36. The Court of Appeal had no problem with this 
issue. It stated that: 235 
[w]e do not consider that s 36 when read with s 3(8) is intended to be confined to 
market activity in the production, acquisition, supply or pricing of goods or services. 
Clearly it extends to conduct capable of " influencing" those market elements. There 
must, however, be a clear and direct link between the influence and the dominant 
position. 
The Court considered that this was further supported by the enactment of s 36(2) 
which prevents the enforcement of intellectual property rights from being considered a 
' use of dominant position in a market'. 236 This would only be necessary if it was 
considered possible that the courts would categorise this as a contravention of s 36.237 
After canvassing the relevant Australian authority the Court decided that : 238 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
the exercise of statutory rights will not necessarily be beyond the scope of the New 
Zealand s 36. As s 3(8) indicates, technical knowledge and access to materials and 
capital are factors in the capacity to influence production and supply and going to 
market dominance. If in a particular case they are an element of a dominant position 
For discussion of the applicability of the US doctrine see above n 220 and above n 221. 
Earlier cases also dealt peripherally with arguments relating to sham litigation but are 
unimportant for present purposes. For example, Bond and Bond Ltd v Fisher & Paykel Ltd 
(1986) 6 NZAR 278 ; and ARA above n 7, 680. 
Above n 147. 
Above n 230 . 
Above n 147, 649. 
Above n 147, 652 . 
Above n 128, 68. 
Above n 147, 651. 
and are used in the course of the exercise of statutory rights for a proscribed purposes s 
36 might be breached. 
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Therefore although the courts recogmse that in certain situations taking legal 
proceedings may be a ' use of dominant position' they also recognise that it is not clear 
what is required to successfully prove this.239 Some guidance is given by the final 
paragraph in Geotherm which states:240 
[a]s already mentioned, it is difficult to suppose that a contravention of the Act will be 
established by the mere reasonable exercise of rights of objection. It is as well to 
expand on this. Even a monopoly must be entitled to make a case to the appropriate 
licensing or other authority for the preservation of its monopoly. This submission of 
reasonable arguments to that end and the taking of reasonable steps to prepare the case 
could not in themselves amount to a use of a dominant position in the market. 
Something more would have to be shown to bring [the] conduct within s 36. 
The issue becomes what is "something more"?241 In Telecom v Clear Smellie J stated 
that a sham litigation argument "is infinitely more difficult to sustain than where a 
more obvious anti-competitive procedure such as price-fixing or refusal to supply raw 
materials, is alleged."242 In assessing the facts he decided that Telecom's refusal to 
refer the dispute to the Commerce Commission did not amount to unreasonable 
behaviour and implied that a complaint that is trivial in nature but which will establish 
a cause of action which could require a Court remedy would fall short of "something 
more". 
In summary, prior to the decisions of the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear, and the 
Court of Appeal in Telecom v Commerce Commission, the courts were open to the 
possibility that in the right circumstances sham litigation would contravene s 36. The 
paper moves on to consider whether sham litigation may still be considered 'use of a 
dominant position' under the new application and interpretation of s 36. In doing this 
239 
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it will be necessary to identify more clearly the necessary circumstances for a sham 
litigation argument and this is discussed in Part IV D - Applying the Theory. 
C Application of Section 36 to Sham Litigation Situations 
To prove a breach of s 36 due to sham litigation requires a person in a dominant 
position in a market who uses that position and has the requisite purpose or purposes. 
These factors are discussed in detail below. 
1 Dominant position in the market place 
The two elements of this requirement do not directly impact on the issue of whether 
sham litigation can be 'use of a dominant position ' . The question of market is factual 
in nature and so will depend on the circumstances of the case. There are two possible 
markets to argue about, the market that the person is dominant in and the market that 
is affected by the dominant firm's conduct (if different) . As noted above the conduct 
does not necessarily have to be ' in' the market as long as it influences market elements 
and presumably this means in either market. 243 
Whether a firm is in a dominant position or not is a very important consideration under 
s 36. However, it will only indirectly affect the issue of sham litigation. The difficulty 
is that currently the threshold for deciding dominant position is extremely high and this 
may mean that firms that are potentially sham litigants only have a ' high ' degree of 
market power and so do not contravene the section.244 A related but somewhat 
different issue is whether it is fair that only firms in a dominant position get sanctioned 
for participating in sham litigation. The answer is that non-dominant firms may also 
succeed with other unilateral conduct, but normally undertaking such conduct is not 
worth the costs associated with it. If firms have enough power to make sham 
litigation a viable strategy but do not pass the high threshold of dominance, one could 
argue that it is the threshold that is at fault rather than the possibility of sham litigation 
being a breach of s 36. 
243 
244 
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See the discussion in Part III C 3 - Dominant Position. 
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2 Use of a dominant position 
Given that the Privy Council test for 'use' of a dominant position is the current 
exposition of the required conduct it will be quite difficult to argue that sham litigation 
is a 'use' of a dominant position. As Gault on Commercial Law states: 245 
[a] rigid adherence to the Privy Council test would exclude all cases of abuse of legal 
rights from action under s 36, unless a very liberal view of the words "but otherwise in 
the same circumstances" is taken. However it is clear that such conduct was 
contemplated as a possible contravention of s 36 because s 36(2) expressly states that a 
person does not use a dominant position in a market for any of the purposes in s 
36(l)(a) to (c) by reason only that they seek to enforce a statutory intellectual property 
right. There would have been no need for this exemption if such conduct could not 
have been argued to be a contravention of s 36. 
Any firm can take court action to enforce contractual or other rights and as such sham 
litigation is possibly conduct that "a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in 
the same circumstances would have acted."246 To circumvent this it would be 
necessary to somehow distinguish normal litigation from sham litigation. The 
difficulty with doing this is that the usual way to distinguish would be to look at the 
purpose of the litigant. This undermines the whole need to look at 'use' as more than 
a mere causal connector and therefore makes the argument somewhat circular. 
Another potential way to circumvent the strict application of this test is to analyse the 
litigation itself to decide if it is reasonable or not. Scott argues that: 247 
245 
246 
247 
[a] non-dominant firm can make reasonable arguments and take reasonable steps in 
preparing a case. "Reasonable arguments" suggest that the firm making them wants to 
or, at least, has a chance to win. A firm that makes unreasonable arguments cannot 
win. A firm in a competitive market could not afford to waste money on a case it could 
not win. Similarly, it would not be able to afford to object regardless of the merits or 
See above n 9, 3-150. 
Above n 8, 403 ; also see generally the discussion in Part III D - Use of a Dominant Position. 
PG Scott "Abuse of Judicial and Administrative Processes - An Antitrust Violation?" (1993) 
21 ABLR 389, 395. 
afford to assist other objectors. A dominant firm that has made monopoly profits could 
afford to do so. It has "deep pockets". In this way a dominant firm uses its position. 
The above factors are also relevant to purpose. A firm which brings a case it cannot 
win must have a purpose other than winning. This must be to harm the other party. 
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One would have to categorise the conduct as unreasonable litigation rather than simply 
litigation. Patterns of sham litigation behaviour may also enable some form of 
differentiation between dominant and non-dominant firms. 248 Of course the counter is 
again that a non-dominant firm can undertake unreasonable litigation or a pattern of 
litigation - especially considering the range of firms that now fall below the dominance 
threshold. However, it is possible that the Court of Appeal would be willing to accept 
this type of analysis if it deemed it necessary to avoid the "artificial scenario" 
postulated by the Privy Council. 249 There are also relitigation problems associated 
with this type of approach. It is not a straightforward issue - one cannot say with 
certainty that if sham litigation is proven that it would be considered a use of dominant 
position. It is enough at this point to say that any window of opportunity opened by 
the Geotherm and Telecom v Clear cases has potentially been closed due to the Privy 
Council test for 'use '. 
3 Purpose 
The definition of sham litigation given above is dependent on the purpose of the 
litigant. Purpose is central to the whole issue of sham litigation being use of dominant 
position. It is not disputed that people have a right to undertake court proceedings for 
vanous reasons . The difficulty is when proceedings are undertaken for anti-
competitive reasons such as deterring, eliminating or preventing someone from 
competing. The United States Grip-Pak Inc v Illinois Tool Works Inc succinctly 
states the difference as being "when the plaintiff's purpose is not to win a favourable 
judgment against a competitor but to harass him and deter others by the process itself, 
regardless of the outcome of litigating. "250 
248 
249 
250 
Above n 247, 401. 
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Grip-Pak Inc v 11/inois Tool Works Inc 694 F.2d 466 (1982), 472. 
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Most of the discussion on sham litigation and the United States sham litigation 
doctrine relates to when exactly the requisite purpose will be shown. Particular 
problems are associated with taking a single case as opposed to patterns of 
litigation. 251 Is there an anti-competitive purpose if the dominant firm actually wins? 
Can a good faith case ever be considered sham litigation and if not what standard is 
required? Does the cause of action have to be frivolous, lacking in merit, baseless, 
unreasonable, unwinable, part of a scheme or policy of harassing the plaintiff or must 
the costs simply outweigh the benefits?252 In almost all the situations listed it is easy 
to say 'but what if ... '. Laying down a specific rule to identify situations where the 
anti-competitive purpose will be assumed, presumed or proven is not the answer. This 
does not mean that the courts have to use an ad hoe approach to these situations, 
rather it requires common sense and a logical approach rather than a set of detailed 
rules. 
A substantial purpose is all that is required by the legislation. 253 This simplifies the 
issue for New Zealand courts. For example, in situations where the sham litigant 
actually wins, as long as one of the substantial purpose in undertaking the proceeding 
comes within the proscribed purposes listed in s 36(1)(a)-(c), then theoretically 
(provided the other elements are fulfilled) there is a breach of s 36. On the other hand, 
is it good policy to punish someone for taking action when the anti-competitive 
purpose is only one of their purposes? A closely related issue is whether it is 
subjective or objective purpose that is relevant. Sham litigation is a situation when 
there is potential for there to be a difference depending on which test is used. This is 
complicated by the fact that quite often legal opinions and therefore legal privilege will 
be a factor in determining the purpose of the litigant. 254 
Prior to the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear, in most cases it was enough to 
prove an anti-competitive purpose and then infer the 'use' element. Now, according 
25 1 
252 
253 
254 
A single, well-timed and carefully-pleaded case with appeals can cost a competitor a large 
amount of money and time even if it is frivolous. A pattern of claims should not be a 
prerequisite but, rather, persuasive evidence of a sham. Academic authority strongly supports 
this. See above n 247, 406. 
Posner J articulated a test in Grip-Pak, above n 250, which relied on a cost-benefit analysis. 
Unless the law suit was cost-justified it is a sham. For more discussion of this point see above 
n 209, -W3. 
See the discussion in Part III E - Purpose. 
Above n 221; also see above n 247 . 
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to the Privy Council, one can infer purpose from use but not use from purpose. 255 If 
this is accurate, even if there is a situation where there is clearly an anti-competitive 
purpose in undertaking litigation, given the extreme problems associated with the 
Privy Council test for 'use' it is unlikely that sham litigation will ever contravenes 36. 
D Applying the Theo,y 
An application of the theory discussed above to a practical situation will illustrate the 
difficulties with the new judicial interpretations of and tests for s 36. The example 
chosen is the Geotherm case because it clearly shows that prior to these new judicial 
tests sham litigation was arguable as a cause of action under s 36. 
l The facts of Geotherm 
The case of Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd involved three parties 
and various allegations of use of a dominant position. 256 For simplicity this discussion 
will just use the two main parties. The first party, Electricity Corporation Ltd 
(Electricorp ), produces and supplies wholesale electricity. The second party, 
Geotherm Energy Ltd (Geotherm), intends to produce electricity through an electrical 
generating plant employing part of the Wairakei geothermal resource and as such will 
be in direct competition with Electricorp. 
It is alleged that Electricorp used its dominant position in undertaking various kinds of 
conduct. The alleged conduct included: giving public statements of policy, objecting 
unnecessarily to statutory applications, inducing agencies to give the corporation 
access to land adjacent to Geotherm, monopolising and foreclosing potential energy 
resources and preventing access to advice. As the focus of this part of the paper is on 
the use of litigation by dominant firms for anti-competitive reasons this discussion 
focuses on the allegation regarding the statutory approvals. 
In relation to the statutory applications Geotherm argued that "Electricorp resisted at 
every stage on all possible grounds, many of them baseless, the statutory applications 
255 
256 
See the discussion in Part III E 3 - Inferring Purpose. 
The three parties are Electricity Corporation Ltd, Trans Power Ltd and Geotherm Energy Ltd. 
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required to be made by the respondents."257 The manner in which the objections were 
undertaken is of particular relevance as it included "alleged perjury, overreaching 
grounds of opposition and assisting other objectors. "258 The discussion below 
addresses whether Geotherm would still have an arguable case under the current 
interpretation and application of s 36. 
2 Analysis 
To show a breach of s 36, Geotherm will need to prove that Electricorp is in a 
dominant position, that it has used that dominant position and that it had one or more 
of the proscribed purposes. 
It is difficult to argue that Electricorp is dominant without information about the 
factual background of the electricity industry and Electricorp's part in that industry. 
However, it is likely that Electricorp will meet the high threshold test for dominant 
position and so it will be assumed (as it was in the original case)259 that Electricorp is 
in a dominant position. The relevant market is either the production of electricity, the 
wholesale supply of electricity or possibly the production and wholesale supply of 
electricity. Given the nature of the industry it is likely that the geographical limits of 
the relevant market will be either the North Island or the central North Island.260 
Due to the new test for 'use' it is difficult to argue that Electricorp has ' used' its 
dominant position. Unless it is conduct that a person not in a dominant position but 
otherwise in the same circumstances would have undertaken, it does not fit within the 
Privy Council test. 261 Generally any firm can object to statutory applications and it is 
not because such a firm is dominant that this conduct is possible. To be successful 
Geotherm will need to get around the Privy Council test. Relying on the effect the 
257 
'.!58 
259 
260 
261 
Above n 147, 650. The statement of claim in respect of this particular allegation also provided 
that the "broad allegation is particularised by reference to certain specific conduct by 
Electricorp relating to Geotherm's planning application to the Taupo County Council, its 
application to the Minister of Energy for geothermal licences and its water rights applications 
under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967." Above n 147, 644. 
Above n l-l7 , 650. 
Above n 147, 647. 
The smaller the market is geographically the more likely it is that Electricorp is dominant. 
Above n 8, 403. 
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conduct has because the firm is dominant will not be sufficient. 262 Geotherm' s best 
argument, if the evidence supports it, is that Electricorp had a policy to exclude 
competitors which incorporates this and other conduct and that there was a pattern of 
behaviour supporting or indicating this policy. It would be useful to look at the 
behaviour ofElectricorp as a whole rather than separating out the policy of the firm (ie 
purpose) from the actions of the firm (ie use) . This might be enough to move the 
conduct from the 'any firm could undertake it' category into the 'only a dominant firm 
could undertake it ' category, especially considering the Court of Appeal ' s attitude 
towards the Privy Council test for use.263 However, it is still at best a tenuous 
argument. 
Geotherm will also have to prove that one of Electricorp ' s substantial purposes when 
utilising its statutory right of objection is one of the proscribed purposes outlined in s 
36(l)(a)-(c). It is unlikely that Geotherm will be able to find any evidence of a policy 
of excluding competitors which is implemented through this behaviour and so it will 
have to rely on proving that an anti-competitive purpose is the only logical reason for 
the conduct undertaken. The difficulty is that there could be many legitimate reasons 
why Electricorp was objecting to Geotherm's statutory application. However, as 
discussed above, it does not have to be the sole purpose, merely a substantial purpose. 
If Electricorp did indeed help other applicants for no apparent reason, overreach the 
grounds of opposition and orchestrate its personnel perjuring themselves it will 
certainly be indicative of an anti-competitive purpose as there are very few other 
reasons for acting this way. Purpose may also be inferred if there is evidence of 
continual objections on previously decided grounds, or continual objections on new 
and frivolous grounds. Such actions may be considered unreasonable and therefore 
contravene the ' reasonableness ' threshold that Geotherm requires.264 U1timately the 
specific facts of the case will help to determine this issue and as Geotherm was an 
application for an interim injunction, there are not enough facts to be certain of this 
point. 
262 
263 
264 
See discussion above in Part III D 3 - The Privy Council Test, especially the text following n 
164. 
Above n 44, 42. 
Above n 147, 655 . The same requirement is referred to in Telecom v Clear see above n 230, 
254. 
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3 Conclusion 
There is a small possibility that Geotherm could prove a breach of s 36 because 
Electricorp used its dominant position for the purpose of preventing or deterring 
Geotherm from competing in the relevant market. As the analysis shows, however, it 
is much more difficult if not impossible to prove this under the new interpretation of s 
3 6 than it was to prove it when the case was first argued in 1991. Even if Geotherm 
can prove all the factual requirements, ultimately it will still be a "matter of fact in each 
case whether the exercise of the rights of objection and the manner of their exercise in 
all the circumstances may be said to constitute use of a dominant market position."265 
In a sham litigation situation the basic intention of the dominant party is to raise its 
rivals costs to deter or eliminate potential rivals from competing. It is a classic 
example of exploiting a dominant position. The current fragmented approach of the 
courts to s 36 cases does not prevent the dominant party from undertaking this course 
of conduct. However, an approach that treats the section as a whole, instead of a 
series of unrelated individual tests, would probably mean that the courts would identify 
this conduct as an exploitation of a dominant position and would act accordingly. 
V CONCLUSION 
Section 36 has been separated into at least three different elements. Each element is 
assessed separately and usually has its own test or tests that are used to indicate when 
the element has been fulfilled. In setting or defining these tests there is a tendency to 
address each element as if it is the sole component of the section. Consequently the 
tests for the element are usually set too high as it is perceived that otherwise the scope 
of the conduct caught would be too wide. The section as a whole is not given enough 
attention and it is the section as a whole that Parliament enacted not separate, 
individual tests. The overall effect is that s 36 has lost most of its power and conduct 
that is theoretically ' use of a dominant position ' is being legitimately undertaken as the 
current interpretation and application of the section no longer proscribes that conduct. 
265 Above n 147, 652. 
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The previous discussion illustrates the difficulty with the section as it is currently 
interpreted and applied. The threshold for dominance is so high that many companies 
with potentially high market power are not caught. The 'use' test is so narrow that 
very little conduct is considered to fulfil it. When combined with the almost impotent 
purpose element the overall effect is a weak and ineffectual constraint on unilateral 
conduct. The specific example discussed, sham litigation, also graphically illustrates 
how weak and ineffectual the section has become as a practice that was previously 
considered 'use of a dominant position ' is now barely arguable under the section. 
If the section was originally enacted to prevent monopolies or dominant firms from 
exploiting their power and this is no longer being achieved then it is time to reassess 
the law. If Parliament's attitude towards unilateral conduct has changed in the last 10 
years then the section will need to be completely revised and rewritten in line with any 
new requirements. However, if Parliament's attitude toward unilateral conduct is the 
same or similar as when s 36 was first enacted then clarification is required . The 
minimum that needs to be done is for Parliament to clarify what is required from the 
'use ' element of the section. More importantly there needs to be some indication that 
the 'use' and ' purpose' element are interconnected and that the section needs to be 
read as a whole, not as a collection of separate tests. Parliament needs to realise that 
how the section was originally interpreted and applied has radically changed from how 
it is interpreted and applied today and if this is cause for concern then immediate 
legislative action is required. 
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VI APPENDICES 
Appendix A Extracts from Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
Section 46(1) 
A corporation that has a substantial degree of power m a market shall not take 
advantage of that power for the purpose of -
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of 
a body corporate that is related to the corporation in that or any other 
market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
( c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in 
that or any other market. 
Section 46(3) 
In determining for the purposes of this section the degree of power that a body 
corporate or bodies corporate has or have in a market, the Court shall have regard to 
the extent to which the conduct of the body corporate or of any of those bodies 
corporate in that market is constrained by the conduct of -
(a) competitors, or potential competitors, of the body corporate or of any of 
those bodies corporate in that market; or 
(b) persons to whom or from whom the body corporate or any of those bodies 
corporate supplies or acquires goods or services in that market. 
Section 46(7) 
Without in any way limiting the manner in which the purpose of a person may be 
established for the purposes of any other provision of this Act, a corporation may be 
taken to have taken advantage of its power for a purpose referred to in sub-section ( 1) 
notwithstanding that after all the evidence has been considered the existence of that 
purpose is ascertainable only by inference from the conduct of the corporation or of 
any other person or from other relevant circumstances. 
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Appendix B Extracts from Re Proposal by News Ltd (1986) 6 NZAR 47, 51. 
Paragraph 10 
Bearing these matters in mind, it may assist for the future if the Commission provides 
an expanded and explanatory list of some of the factors (including those set out in s 
3(8)) which may be relevant to the issue: 
(i) The structure of the market, which requires a consideration of: 
(a) The share of the market of the merged new concern. 
(b) The degree of market concentration. 
( c) The size distribution of all concerns in the market. 
( d) The extent to which the products in question are characterised by product 
differentiation and sales promotion, ie whether there are reasonably close 
substitutes. 
( e) Access to technical knowledge, materials and capital. 
(f) The financial stability of the merged concern in relation to other operators 
in the market. 
(g) The nature of any formal , stable and fundamental contracts, arrangements 
or understandings between concerns in the market. 
(h) The extent of corporate integration (eg interlocking shareholdings and 
cross-directorships) among concerns in the market. 
(i) The extent of vertical integration. 
(ii) The extent of restraints imposed by the conduct of competitors or potential 
competitors or by others affected, which requires a consideration of: 
(a) The extent to which competition exists or has existed and 1s likely to 
continue. 
(b) The extent to which the concern 1s constrained by the conduct of 
competitors. 
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( c) The capacity of the concern to determine prices in or to exclude entry to 
the market without being inhibited in that determination or action by 
suppliers and acquirers . 
( d) The height of barriers to entry in that market and the ability of potential 
competitors to enter the market and to sustain a position in the market. 
This list is not necessary exhaustive of the matters which need to be considered. Nor 
may all of these factors be relevant in any particular case. Further, there is no absolute 
measure by which a dominant position can be determined - only a mix of factors upon 
which a judgment is to be based . The importance of any particular factor will depend 
upon the particular proposal under consideration. The end result of the assessment 
required by s 66(7) is to test whether in the relevant markets, having regard to all of 
these factors, the degree of dominance of the new concern, as created or strengthened 
by the proposal, allows or would be likely to allow workable or effective competition 
in the relevant market. 
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Appendix C Alternative Legislative Tests for 'Use ' and 'Purpose' 
The first alternative is from Y van Roy "The Privy Council Decision in Telecom v 
Clear: Narrowing the Application of s36 of the Commerce Act 1986" [ 1995] NZLJ 
54, 60 . 
A helpful way to proceed would be to specify in the Act that "use" of a dominant 
position should be determined as a causal link between the conduct at issue and the 
dominance, and then to outline the ways in which "use" might be determined. These 
should include: 
(i) Conduct which would only be done by a firm with market power, or which 
would not be done by a firm in a competitive market situation; and 
(ii) Conduct which only has an anti-competitive effect when carried out by a firm 
with market power; and 
(iii) Any other method that the Court thinks best describes the causal connection 
between use and dominance in the particular case, taking into account the 
market context of the conduct. 
An overriding statement that it is the purpose of the conduct which determines which 
uses contravene the Act would also be helpful. This would ensure the importance of 
the determination of "purpose", and consistency with cases in Australia. The above 
guidelines would spell out what a Court is endeavouring to do in determining "use" (ie 
determining the causal connection), and would leave it to the good sense of the courts 
to understand which method to choose. 
The second alternative is from LF Hampton "Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 
1986: An Analysis of its Constituent Elements" in RJ Adhar (ed) Competition Law 
and Policy in New Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 179, 199. 
The following classification attempts to specify the conditions under which conduct is 
likely to constitute a use of a dominant position under s. 36 (assuming proof of the 
requisite purpose) : 
(a) where the conduct could only be performed by a person in a dominant position 
(market dominance is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the offence); or 
(b) where the conduct could be performed by both dominant and non-dominant 
firms : 
(i) where no harmful effect would have resulted if there had not been a 
dominant position (market dominance is a necessary condition for the 
effect to result); or 
(ii) where the harmful effect would have occurred irrespective of the market 
power of the respondent firm, but where the harmful effect was 
strengthened by the circumstance that the respondent was indeed dominant 
(market dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the effect to 
result) . 
Category (b )(ii) is troublesome since it could encompass ordinary business practices 
typical of those used in a competitive market. 
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